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ABSTRACT 
The intent of this study is to provide formal apparatus which 
facilitates the investigation of problems in the methodology of science. 
The introduction contains several examples of such problems and 
motivates the subsequent formalism. 
A general definition of a formal language is presented, and this 
definition is used to characterize an individual's view of the world 
around him. A notion of empirical observatfon is developed which is 
independent of language. The interplay of formal language and obser-
vation is taken as the central theme. The process of science is 
conceived as the finding of that formal language that best expresses the 
available experimental evidence. 
To characterize the manner in which a formal language imposes 
structure on its universe of discourse, the fundamental concepts of 
elements and states of a formal language are introduced. Using these, 
the notion of a basis for a formal language is developed as a collection 
of minimal states distinguishable within the language. The relation of 
these concepts to those of model theory is discussed. 
An a priori probability defined on sets of observations is postu-
lated as a reflection of an individual's ontology. This probability, in 
conjunction with a formal language and a basis for that language, induces 
a subjective probability describing an indi:V-idual 's conceptual view of 
admissible configurations of the universe. As a function of this 
subjective probability, and consequently of language, a measure of the 
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informativeness of empirical observations is introduced and is shown 
to be intuitively plausible - particularly in the case of scientific 
experimentation. 
The developed formalism is then systematically applied to the 
general problems presented in the introduction. The relationship of 
scientific theories to empirical observations is discussed and the need 
for certain tacit, unstatable knowledge is shown to be necessary to 
fully comprehend the meaning of realistic theories. The idea that many 
common concepts can be specified only by drawing on knowledge obtained 
from an infinite number of observations is presented, and the problems 
of reductionism are examined in this context. 
A definition of when one formal language can be considered to be 
more expressive than another is presented, and the change in the 
informativeness of an observation as language changes is investigated. 
In this regard it is shown that the information inherent in an observation 
may decrease for a more expressive language. 
The general problem of induction and its relation to the scientific 
method are discussed. Two hypotheses concerning an individual's 
selection of an optimal lan,gua,ge for a particular domain of discourse 
are presented and specific examples from the introduction are examined. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The tremendous scientific advances of the last several centuries 
have resulted in a variety of new disciplines and a greater degree of 
specialization in existing ones. In spite of this rapid growth and 
diversification, there remains a very firm belief on the part of many 
researchers in the unity of science. This view is aptly summarized 
in the following statement by Lee A. DuBridge [ 13, p. 6]. 
" .•• science has reached a new level of attainment. Men 
now do comprehend the basic laws that enable them to 
interpret, and even in a large measure to predict, the 
behavior of the physical world-the world of the earth, 
the sun, the planets, the stars; of electricity and gravi-
tation and the forces that hold atoms and molecules 
together. We even know that the processes of life depend 
on these same physical laws; that life is, in a very deep 
sense, the ultimate proof of the quantum theory. Hence, 
man's eternal quest for understanding of the world about 
him has led finally to the beginning of understanding the 
world within him." 
Although many philosophers and scientific historians have con-
tributed greatly to our understanding of science, there remain many 
difficult problems, and much needs to be done to fully explicate the 
scientific method and to characterize the relationship of the scientist 
to his science. In particular_ the means by which a scientist becomes 
better informed, either by the gathering of experimental data or by 
communication with other researchers, is poorly understood. A 
prime task of information science shoo.Id be the formulation of con-
cepts which are useful in understanding these processes. This thesis 
is directed to that task. 
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The formal apparatus which is developed in subsequent chapters 
would be barren if it did not provide insight into basic informational 
problems and, in particular, into fundamental problems in the develop-
ment and understanding of science. Therefore, in order to give per-
spective to these later quantitative chapters, we will begin by sketching 
several examples of such problems. We complete this introductory 
chapter by identifying two, more general philosophical issues, namely 
the problem of reductionism, and the question of the relationships 
between scientific theory and empirical observations. 
The central portion of the thesis develops a mathematical 
apparatus by means of which these issues raised in the introduction 
can be formally treated. The later part of the thesis then returns to 
the problems of the introduction, viewing them from the vantage point 
of the developed apparatus. 
Consider the relationship of the individual and his science as 
reflected in the language he uses to describe his theories and obser-
vations. As Polanyi points out, we often find that the words or con-
cepts in this language shift in meaning on the basis of new observational 
evidence [26, p. 111]. 
"When heavy hydrogen (deuterium) was discovered by Urey 
in 19 32, it was described by him as a new isotope of hydro-
gen. At a discussion held by the Royal Society in 19 34 the 
discoverer of isotopy, Frederic Soddy, objected to this on 
the grounds that he had originally defined the isotopes of an 
element as chemically inseparable from each other, and 
heavy hydrogen was chemically separable from light hydro-
gen. No attention was paid to this protest and a new meaning 
of the term 'isotope' was tacitly accepted instead. The new 
meaning allowed heavy hydrogen to be included among the 
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isotopes of hydrogen, in spite of its unprecedented property 
of being chemically separable from its fellow isotopes. 
Thus the statement 'There exists an element deuterium 
which is an isotope of hydrogen' was accepted in a sense 
which re-defined the term isotope, so that this statement, 
which otherwise would be false, became true. The new 
conception abandoned a previously accepted criterion of 
isotopy as superficial, and relied instead only on the 
identity of nuclear charges in isotopes. 
"Our identification of deuterium as an isotope of hydrogen 
thus affirms two things: ( 1) that there exists in the case 
of hydrogen and deuterium an instance of a new kind of 
chemical separability, pertaining to two elements of equal 
nuclear charge, (Z) that these elements are to be regarded 
as isotopes in spite of their separability, merely on the 
grounds of their equal nuclear charge. The new observa-
tions referred to in ( 1) necessitated the conceptual and 
linguistic reforms decreed in ( 2). 11 
This example illustrates that scientific terms tend to be redefined 
from time to time. One obvious question is why this process of re-
interpretation takes place at all. What combination of circumstances 
necessitates such a change in language? Even more important, when 
words do change their meanings, what becomes of the theories which 
made use of them, and what is the weight of old observations on new 
enunciations of theory? 
A closely related problem concerns two observers who use the 
same term, but one of them has a more detailed or ramified view of 
the concept denoted by the term than the other. For instance, an 
electrical circuit designer might visualize a "transistor" as a current-
controlled device having three terminals and functional behavior des-
cribed by a certain set of input-output equations. A solid state 
physicist, however, might very well characterize a "transistor" as a 
piece of semi-conducting material with a certain distribution of 
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impurities which determine how the electrons and ''holes" will move 
through the material when a potential difference exists. He may also 
implicitly associate such concepts as the mean free path of an electron, 
or the avalanche breakdown voltage of a junction with his notion of 
transistor. 
There are clearly many circumstances when these rnen rnight 
find it advantageous or essential to converse on subjects which pre-
suppose an understanding of what a transistor is. Even if we assum.e 
that their views are not fundamentally conflicting, we must admit that 
they implicitly disagree on what the relevant properties of a transistor 
are. Nevertheless, communication does take place, and presumably 
information is exchanged. But if these men both observe a transistor 
behaving in a certain novel fashion, are they equally informed by this 
observation? Will they both describe the observation in similar terms? 
Another interesting phenomenon is illustrated by a comparison 
between what might be called the explicit scope and implicit scope of 
a scientific paper. Consider a biologist who describes the response 
characteristics of some neuron in a particular nerve ganglion of an 
insect, say the wolf spider. The writer is generally very careful to 
indicate that his results apply only under a certain set of experimental 
conditions. Sometimes the experimental animals are mutants, or many 
generations of them have been bred in the laboratory. And perhaps the 
stimulus is one which the animal would not normally encounter. Re-
strictions such as these, which are obviously necessary for practical 
reasons, tend to confine the stated results to rather specific cases. 
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What is the character of the information conveyed by such a paper? 
If the article is published in a reputable journal, is this because the 
editors believe that the restricted results obtained for the wolf spider 
are of overwhelming interest? It would not seem so. Rather, it must 
be that the results are supposed to have implications of a more general 
nature. Indeed, it would appear that these often unstated generaliza-
tions of the conclusions in the paper constitute much of its real 
significance. Writing in The American Psychologist, F. A. Beach 
emphasizes a slightly different aspect of this point in relation to the 
field of comparative psychology. ( 1, p. 119]. 
"Perhaps it would be appropriate to change the title of our 
journal to read 'The Journal of Rat Learning', but there 
are many who would object to this procedure because they 
appear to believe that in studying the rat they are studying 
all or nearly all that is important in behavior. At least 
I suspect this is the case. How else can one explain the 
fact that Professor Tolman' s book, 'Purposeful Behavior 
in Animals and Men 1 , deals primarily with learning and 
is dedicated to the white rat, 'where, perhaps, most of 
all, the final credit or discredit belongs'. And how else 
are we to interpret Professor Skinner's 457-page opus 
which is based exclusively upon the performance of rats 
in bar-pressing situations but is entitled simply 'The 
Behavior of Organisms'?" 
These three examples, from many that could be mentioned, illus-
trate problems of detail in understanding the current scientific scheme. 
We discuss now two problems of a more general nature which have 
loomed large in the consideration of the philosophy of science. The 
first of these is reductionism, which concerns the relationships be-
tween one theory and another, and the links connecting a theory with 
the observational data supporting it. Historically, the ideas of re-
ductionism have been of paramount importance in influencing the 
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attitudes of scientists on these questions. There are two problems, 
each of which has gone under the name reductionism, which should 
be distinguished although they are closely related. With regard to 
theory and observations, the purest form of reductionism is sum-
marized by the view that every theoretical term can be explicitly 
defined in terms of observable quantities.. That is, theories were 
considered to be simply disguised references to facts. These 
assumptions were quite prevalent until the early part of this century. 
As an example, Russell maintained the following. ( 33, p. 146]. 
"Physics cannot be regarded as validly based upon em-
pirical data until [light] waves have been expressed as 
functions of the colours and other sense-data. " 
The theory of relativity was instrumental in the demise of this 
very restrictive viewpoint. Statements such as "Space is curved in the 
neighborhood of the sun", were easily seen to be observationally un-
verifiable, at least directly. More recently, this form of reduction-
ism was modified to allow such statements to be indirectly verified, 
for instance, by observing that light passing near the sun was de-
fleeted. However, this raises other problems since the original 
statement cannot be tested if no light is passing by the sun. Never-
theless, vestiges of these concepts are still evident today, parti-
cularly in those areas of scientific endeavor which have not proven 
amenable to the methods of formal mathematics. Thus, the re are 
some researchers, in fields such as biology, who contend that the 
gathering of experimental data is informative in itself. That is, the 
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mere existence of knowledge about an organism conveys information, 
even in the absence of any theoretical framework. Examples such as 
this demo~strate that the role of abstract theory as it relates to the 
acquisition of scientific knowledge remains open to question. In 
order to speak sensibly about information, therefore, it is necessary 
to examine how observational evidence and theories interact. They 
certainly appear to be independent in some respects, and yet our in-
tuition indicates that they normally combine to support one another. 
A second aspect of the reductionist philosophy deals with the 
problems of reducing o~e theory to another more basic one. For 
example, in the nineteenth century, classical mechanics was thought 
to be basic to much of science, and new theories such as thermo-
dynamics were justified in part by tdemonstrating that they could be 
restated in the framework of classical mechanics. Many scientists 
went so far as to propose that all scientific phenomena should be 
reducible to some universal physical science. However, biologists, 
for example, generally refuted this view by claiming that there were 
characteristics of living organisms which could not be explicated in 
terms of atomic particles or any similar notions. These questions 
certainly bear directly on metaphysical assumptions concerning the 
unity of science. For a detailed historical discussion o! these 
phenomena, see Nagel [ 25, chap. 11 J. 
At the present time, very little effort is being expended to 
formally reduce one scientific theory to another, although there have 
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been recent attempts to partially axiomatize biology, for example 
[ 46]. Instead, reducibility is often tacitly assumed, at least in an 
informal sense. Thus, even though physical chemistry and quantum 
mechanics are not explicitly linked by systems of axioms, they are 
treated as though intimately related. Furthermore, recent advances 
in the biological sciences have revitalized the reductionist viewpoint 
in this area, as the following quotation from Sinsheime r indicates 
[ 38, p. 5]. 
''As we have penetrated the processes of the living cell, 
as the domains of mystery have receded, it has become 
ever more clear that all the properties of life can be 
understood to be simply inherent in the material proper-
ties of the complex molecules which comprise a cell. 
And thus that seemingly qualitative gap-self-evident 
to the most na1ve-between the living and the non-living 
has in our time been bridged. Life is but a property of 
matter in a certain state of organization, and, given an 
organization which can reproduce itself, then adaptation 
and natural selection and, consequently, evolution will 
be just as inevitable a process as is the action of the 
second law of thermodynamics. " 
We now turn to the general question of the relationships between 
an abstract scientific theory and the empirical observational evidence 
supporting it. In this connection we inquire under what conditions a 
theory may be considered to be false. One obvious instance in which 
we would say that a given theory is false is if it is logically inconsistent. 
That is, the statements which characterize the theory contradict one 
another. Suppose, however, that the theory we are considering is not 
inconsistent. In this case, there will be some model for which the 
statements constituting the theory are all true. This model thus 
represents a possible reality, although it is not necessarily a plaus-
ible one from our standpoint. Therefore, given some set of statements 
- 9 -
which we call a theory, if these statements are logically consistent, 
we can postulate some collection of objects and relationships among 
them together with some interpretation of the sentences of our theory 
so that the theory becomes true of this domain. As we implied, the 
interpretation necessary to make the statements of the theory true 
may not agree with our common sense or our notion of reality. The 
pertinent question here is how one is able to make a distinction between 
what is plausible and what is implausible. Our intuition suggests that 
this must depend upon our observational experience, and that even 
though an abstract theory which is logically consistent has some model, 
this model may not conform to our empirical observations. We can 
therefore conclude that a consistent theory can not be said to be false 
without reference to observations or some means of characterizing 
the domain to which the theory refers. 
As a simple example of this, suppose that we consider the state-
ment "l /x is a rational number" as a theory. If this statement is about 
the positive integers it is certainly true, but if we are referring to the 
real numbers it is not universally true. Perhaps we are speaking about 
all 0:£ the integers and not just the positive ones; then what is the situa-
tion when x = O? We might regard the statement as false in this case, 
or we could say that it is meaningless or undefined. Notice, therefore, 
that we must be able to specifically delimit the objects to which a theory 
refers in order to be able to assert its truth or falsity. This corresponds 
to interpreting the words of the abstract statements into particular 
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entities, just as we have been concerned with the meaning of x in the 
example. These entities could be determined, in simple cases, by 
pointing to them one by one, or they might be characterized by some 
property which they have in common; but either directly or indirectly, 
certain observational evidence will be involved. 
No'W assume that 'WC have some set of observations; can we then 
say definitely when a given theory is false of these observations? Here 
again we are faced with the dilemma of what a proper interpretation of 
the statements of the theory is to be. Thus, if we had an interpretation 
such that the statements of the theory were true of our observational 
experience, what if we then made some observation which the theory 
does not adequately explain? One possibility is that we may simply 
make the interpretation of the concepts in the theory less restrictive, 
thereby causing the theory to encompass the new observation. Con-
sequently, without changing the statement of the theory we are never-
theless able to extend it to accommodate new evidence. Even though 
this may be technically possible, it is often not esthetically pleasing, 
and rather than extending the old theory by reinterpretation, it is 
discarded and a new theoretica:i. framework is introduced in its place. 
Under what circumstances is a theory discarded and no longer con-
sidered to be scientific, and conversely, when can it be extended to 
explain some new phenomenon? Describing the anomalies confronting 
the scientific historian, Kuhn [ 22, p. 2] makes the following comment 
on this difficult problem. 
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"Simultaneously, these same historians confront growing 
difficulties in distinguishing the 'scientific' component of 
past observation and belief from what their predecessors 
have readily labeled 'error' and 'superstition'. The more 
carefully they study, say, Aristotelian dynamics, phlogistic 
chemistry, or caloric thermodynamics, the more certain 
they feel that those once current views of nature were, as 
a whole, neither less scientific nor more the product of 
human idiosyncrasy than those current today. If these 
out-of-date beliefs are to be called myths, then myths 
can be produced by the same sorts of methods and held 
for the same sorts of reasons that now lead to scientific 
knowledge. " 
Thus, the question of what is science and what is merely super-
stition is irrevocably bound to the notion of what constitutes a valid 
interpretation of an abstract scientific theory and thereby to the ob-
servations held to be relevant to it. 
To say this, however, is only half of the problem. The plausi-
bility or implausibility of an interpretation of some theory presumably 
depends directly on the individual's metaphysical assumptions about 
the nature of reality. Quine [ 30, p. 17] says the following about the 
relationship between an individual's ontology and scientific theory. 
''Our acceptance of an ontology is, I think, similar in 
principle to our acceptance of a scientific theory, say 
a system of physics: we adopt, at least insofar as we 
are reasonable, the simplest conceptual scheme into 
which the disordered fragments of a raw experience can 
be fitted and arranged. Our ontology is determined once 
we have fixed upon the over-all conceptual scheme which 
is to accommodate science in the broadest sense; and the 
considerations which determine a reasonable construction 
of any part of that conceptual scheme, for example, the 
biological or the physical part, are not different in kind 
from the considerations which determine a reasonable 
construction of the whole. To whatever extent the adop-
tion of any system of scientific theory may be said to be 
a matter of language. the same-but no more-may be 
said of the adoption of an ontology. '' 
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II. FORMAL LANGUAGES 
In th_e introduction, we broadly outlined the problem area by 
means of a nwnber of examples. This chapter will establish a specific 
framework within which the questions we have raised can be meaning-
fully discussed. In order to do this, we shall present a formalized 
theory. The question is, what type of theory is appropriate to the 
study and understanding of information processes. Since we are in-
terested primarily in a description of how an individual, such as a 
scientific researcher, gains knowledge and structures the raw data 
he gathers, we should like to be able to characterize his personal 
view of his science. Therefore, the techniques used in well-
established domains such as automata theory or information theory 
would seem to be unsuitable, at least intuitively, because they do 
not provide an apparatus for dealing with the subjective, differ-
entiating aspects of an individual's understanding. Also, since 
communication by means of the spoken or written word is a basic 
process by which information is conveyed, our selection of a the-
oretical framework should be guided by the theory's ability to 
explicate this phenomenon. These considerations suggest that an 
individual's language is of prime importance in determining how he 
becomes informed [ 44, p. 207]. Therefore, we shall formalize 
the notion of an individual's language as it might relate to some 
restricted domain of discourse. 
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Our definition of a language will be firmly based on the notion 
of constructivity. Certain classes of constructive procedures have 
been studie-d in great detail. For instance, the methods of recursive 
function theory [ZO], Turing machines [43], the X.-calculus of 
Church [IO], and Post production systems [28] have all been used 
to characterize what we :mean by an effective process. In spite of 
the fact that the formalism underlying these methods differs widely, 
their intent is similar, and, indeed they have been shown to be mathe-
matically equivalent. We shall use the term constructive to mean that 
given certain primitives and rules for operating on them, there is a 
well-defined procedure for deriving some result. In particular, the 
structures associated with our languages will have this property. We 
shall assume that any of the above formulations of constructivity co-
incides with our intuitive meaning of this notion, a view enunciated 
by Church [IO, sec. 62]. 
We shall also be concerned with relating our definition of a 
language to modern structural linguistics. In this regard, the follow-
ing statement of Chomsky's is of prime importance [ 7, p. 1 J • 
"The central fact to which any significant linguistic theory 
must address itself is this: a mature speaker can produce 
a new sentence of his language on the appropriate occasion, 
and other speakers can understand it immediately, though 
it is equally new to them. " 
The ideas expressed in this passage will be shown to relate 
directly to the question of constructivity. In addition, we shall make 
Use of many of the linguistic concepts pertaining to the syntax and 
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semantics of languages, particularly those dealing with the formal 
properties of grammars. 
At this point, we should remark that we are not interested in 
language per se, at least in the normal sense of languages which are 
spoken or written. Rather we are interested in language as a vehicle 
ernbociying certain structure, and we shall regard it as a formal 
apparatus for explicating what is going on internal to a man's 
understanding. Therefore, this chapter will be devoted primarily to 
a characterization of the structural properties of language. 
Now that we have indicated the suitability of the linguistic 
approach to the understanding of information processes, we shall 
describe precisely what we mean by a formal language. Such a 
language is to be distinguished from the natural languages, such as 
English or German, which do not have sufficiently well-defined rules 
for sentence formation, nor do they have a fixed vocabulary. However, 
as indicated by the above discussion, our definition of a formal lan-
guage will provide a reasonable approximation to certain limited kinds 
of natural language communication. Mathematicians and logicians 
have used the notion of a formal language for a nwnber of years. Most 
often they are referring to a rigid and highly stylized language within 
Which a mathematical theory is expressed, the first ... order predicate 
calculus, for example. We should like to take a somewhat broader 
viewpoint and examine the minimwn conditions characterizing a for-
rnal language. 
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First of all, such a language should have a well-defined 
vocabulary or set of symbols which can be combined into meaningful 
strings of the ianguage. Thus, the vocabulary of a formal language 
should be fixed, although it may be extremely large. Secondly, the 
sentences of the formal language should be certain finite strings of 
vocabulary sy:mbols. And finally,. given a string of sy:mbols which 
constitutes a sentence, we should be able to specify a process for 
determining the meaning of that sentence. 
Obviously, in order to be able to describe a formal language, 
we shall be forced to adopt some language, known as the meta-
language, within which we embed our description. Furthermore, to 
determine the meaning of a sentence in a formal language, we shall 
need some model or structure which expresses the actual or possible 
interrelationships among the objects in the universe of discourse of 
the language. Thus, a sentence would be true of a model, if the 
objects referred to by the sentence have the structure within the 
rnodel that the sentence requires. 
The concepts developed in the area of model theory are quite 
similar to those we are seeking for this purpose [ 31]. However, in 
rnodel theory, the models used are specific to the language being 
considered, the first-order predicate calculus, for ex.ample. These 
Inodels are formulated in terms of set theory, and, indeed, set-
theoretic models comprehend those of model theory. Since we wish 
to deal with a variety of languages and to characterize a model 
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independently of them, our notion of model will be based on set 
theory. 
The decision to structure our models in this way carries 
with it certain basic metaphysical assumptions. In essence, we are 
implying that Aristotelian logic and the concept of extensionality are 
valid for the universe of discourse of forrnal languages. That is, 
-----w~ a..r~_a.asUl'l'ling that what is relates to an existing e~ternal world, 
in contrast to the-phenomenalistic view that physical objects are 
merely convenient ·myths. Extensionality dictates that distinct 
,_()pje~ts ?r things possess different properties and are sensibly 
diff~~~:g._tj,g.ble. These assumptions seem reasonable, and they 
clearly underlie all of modern science. We therefore make the 
basic ontological assumption that the universe of discourse of a 
formal language is set-theoretic in nature. By this we mean that 
objects and relationships denoted by the words of the language can 
be modeled by abstract sets and are expressible within set theory. 
This, of course, coincides with the practices of mathematical science 
today. Hence, the models for our formal languages will be models of 
axiomatic set theory. 
A model of set theory will be interpreted as a set S of objects 
in the universe and an associated E , which is a binary relation on S 
satisfying the axioms of set theory. We shall take as axioms those 
of Zermelo-Frankel set theory since we shall not need the class-set 
di t• 
s inction of the Hilbert-Bernays system [ 11]. We assume the 
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consistency of the axioms of set theory. thereby guaranteeing the 
existence of a model. Notice that there will be many models satis-
fying the conditions we have specified. Therefore, for a given S , 
in addition to the model where £ is the "natural £ ", i. e. the 
standard model, and other models on S isomorphic to some stand-
ard model, we a.re also allowing a.11 non-standard models on S • 
The natural c of set theory will be denoted by E, and the collec-
tion of all models of set theory by rn , where 
rn = [MI M = < S, £ > is a model of set theory. } s is fixed. 
Fixing the set of objectIS S may seem arbitrarily restrictive, 
but this is not so if we assume that S is large enough to contain a 
set corresponding to every object in the universe of discourse. The 
fact that the universe of discourse can never encompass everything 
is irrelevant to this thesis and will not be further discussed. S is 
guaranteed to be at least countably infinite by the set-theoretic axiom 
of infinity. In general, of course, a given formal language will refer 
only to some subset of S • 
In order to be precise in our formulations, we shall make use 
of a special language to be used as a descriptive aid in characterizing 
the semantics of formal languages. This language will be referred to 
as the language of set theory, and it comprises the standard formula-
tion of the lower predicate calculus with an identity symbol and a 
single binary predicate E • In addition, we shall refer to the axioms 
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of set theory as expressions within this framework. Furthermore, we 
will augment this language occasionally with a denwnerable nwnber of 
names corresponding to particular elements of S • Both this language 
and the formal languages we shall define are considered to be in the 
domain of discourse of our meta-language. That is, they are object 
languages. The rneta.-langua.ge itself is assumed to be normal English 
together with an en:bodiment of the notion of a set. Thus, the meta-
language speaks primarily about sets and is concerned with character-
izing the relationships among the language of set theory, other formal 
languages, and the objects and relations to which they refer. 
Using the language of set theory, we shall formulate the notions 
of meaning for a formal language and completely specify the semantics 
of such a language. It should be clearly understood that when we say 
that we as smne the universe is set-theoretic in nature, we do not mean 
that a speaker of a formal language thinks about the universe as a col-
lection of abstract sets. Rather, we mean that some hypothetical 
omniscient being, who "speaks" the meta-language, could analyze 
such a speaker's responses to questions in terms of set theory. On 
the one hand., we should like to make our ontology as strong as pas sible. 
because to do so lends additional underlying structure to our character-
ization of formal languages. On the other hand, if our ontology is too 
Powerful., the allowable models may not include some possibilities 
Which we intuitively feel are reasonable. In this case, we would 
Preempt some of the aspects of understanding we are trying to 
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explicate. Thus, our set-theoretic ontology has been selected as 
one which has sufficient structure to permit formalization of the 
semantics of a formal language without excluding models or con-
figurations of the universe which are obviously plausible. 
In view of the preceding remarks, we can now specify more 
precisely the minimal constituents of a formal language: 
(i) A recursively enwnerable set of symbols T. 
~:.e * (ii) A set of sentences g !;;' T • (The notation T 
designates the set of all finite strings of elements 
of T.) 
(iii) For each model M = < S, t > of set theory, and 
each sentence "Y E g , Cfl(M, ')') is a function whose 
value is the truth value of the sentence "Y for the 
model M • cp is called an interpretation [ 14]. 
These three conditions are certainly necessary for a language, 
but are there other criteria which a formal language should satisfy? 
SupposeJ for instance, that we are given a string of symbols which 
is a sentence of the language. We feel intuitively that there must be 
sorne finite process by which we can determine this fact. [ 7~ p. I]. 
That is, there should exist some algorithmic method for parsing the 
String and thus recognizing it as a sentence. If this were not the case, 
\Ve would clearly be unable to ascertain the meaning of a sentence in a 
finite amount of time. Notice that we are not requiring the somewhat 
stronger condition that any string of symbols can be classified either 
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a.s a sentence or a non-sentence in a finite nw:nber of steps. In sum-
mary, this additional restriction means that the set of sentences of a 
formal language must be recursively enwnerable. The set of rules 
determining the process by means of which a sentence can be analyzed 
or generated is known as the grammar of the language. Properties of 
various types of gra:m:mars have been intensively studied by modern 
structural linguists. Our requirement that the set of sentences must 
be able to be enumerated recursively by the grammar is generally 
accepted as the weakest possible condition for a formal grammar. 
Chomsky designates such grammars as Type 0 and discusses features 
of the5e and other more restrictive grannnars in [ 6] •. 
Now consider the notion of the logical consequences of some set 
of sentences. Following Tarski [ 39, chap. 16], we will say that a 
sentence 'Y is a logical consequence of some set of sentences e , if 
whenever all of the sentences of e are true, then 'Y is also true. 
We mean truth here in the sense of condition (iii) above, that is, in 
terms of the interpretation cp which is defined for any sentence 'Y 
and each model M of set theory. We remark that the concept of 
logical consequence as defined above does not necessarily embody a 
notion of proof. Hence, knowing that 'Y is a logical consequence of 
e does not mean that 'Y is provable from e . A more thorough dis-
cussion of this distinction will be given in chapter IV. 
Suppose that we have a set of sentences e and some sentence 
'Y such that for every configuration of the Wl.iverse, i. e. model, for 
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which all of the sentences of e are true, 'Y is also true. Thus 'Y is 
a logical consequence of e . Notice that this relationship is independ-
ent of specific knowledge about, the universe. For instance, we pre-
sumably cannot decide the truth of the sentence "All men are mortal" 
because this depends upon knowledge about the world which we are in-
capable of obtaining. But if we are told that "All men are mortal" and 
that "George is a man", we conclude that the sentence "George is 
mortal" is a logical consequence of the preceding two sentences. 
Hence, our conclusion is based not upon the specific conditions for 
the truth of each sentence, but rather on a relationship among their 
truth conditions. 
To require that we are able to decide in a finite number of 
steps whether or not a given sentence is true is certainly too restric-
tive. Such a position is tantamount to the strong verifiability theory 
of meaning of the logical positivists, and, as mentioned above, this 
has been refuted. But if we are given some set of sentences e and 
a logical consequence 'Y of e , then we should have some finitary 
process for deciding that this is the case. That is, there must be a 
constructive procedure for enumerating the logical consequences of a 
set of sentences e • We now state these two additional conditions 
formally • 
.£?nditions of Adequacy for a Formal Language: 
(i) The set of sentences g is recursively emuner-
able over T • 
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(ii) For any set of sentences e !;; g , the logical 
consequences of e are recursively enwner-
able over e. 
At this point we shall introduce a definition of formal language, 
and later, we will show it satisfies the conditions of adequacy. 
Definition: A language t = <Syn, Sem, Rn> is a formal language if: 
( 1) Syn = < T, P, L, G, cr > is a syntax for S:, , that is 
( i) T is a finite or countably infinite set, the 
referent words or terminal vocabulary of l. • 
(ii) P is a finite set and P n T = ¢ • P is the set 
of parts of speech or the non-terminal vocab-
ulary. 
(iii) L is a finite set of rules of the form a-J3 , 
where a E P , J3 ET • L is the lexicon. 
(iv) G is a finite set of rules of the form a -J3 , 
~·-
where a, J3 E P ··• G is the set of grammar 
rules. 
(v) a E P • cr is a preferred part of speech, con-
sidered to be the part of speech of sentences. 
( 2) Sem = < C , T > is a semantics for S:, , that is 
(i) C assigns to each part of speech a E P , a form-
ula F(x) of the language of set theory, and C 
assigns to cr e- P the formula x = 0 v x = 1. We 
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will typically write C (x) rather than F(x) • 
a 
C will be called a semantic category. 
a 
(ii) T assigns to each rule of grammar R: a 1a 2• • • 
an --'31 '3 2• • • (3m E G , a formula of the language 
of set theory F(x • • • x , y • • • y ) such l' ' m l' ' n 
that F(x1 ,. x 2 ,. • • ·, xm, y 1, y 2 ,. • • • yn) is of 
such a nature that it implies c'31(xl) /\· •• " 
C (3 ( xm) /\ Ca 
1
< y 1) /\ • • • /\ Ca ( y n)• TR will be 
m n 
called a semantic transformation. 
( 3) Rn = < tn, t > is. a realization space for S.. , that is 
(i) tn = [Ml M = < S, £ > is a model of the language 
of set theory}, where S is fixed. ll\ represents 
all possible configurations of the objects in the 
universe. 
(ii)~ = fcplcp maps T into S} • ~ is the set of 
interpretations of l . 
A number of comments need to be made to aid in the interpre-
tation of the preceding definition. Our notion of a syntax, for instance, 
is closely related to the representation of a syntax in algebraic lin-
guistics. In terms common in that field we would say that < TU P, T, 
LUG, cr > is a syntax [ 15, p. 8]. Also, the grammar G is an 
arbitrary Post production grammar or general rewrite rule grammar. 
There could obviously be special cases of a formal language where 
the grammar was context-free or some other particular form. 
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However, we shall not be too deeply concerned with the details of the 
syntax, since the properties of grammars such as this have received 
a great deal of attention in the literature, for example [ 6, 8, 15 J. 
Notice that there may be referent words, i.e. elements of T , that 
do not participate in any meaningful. strings of a language, since 
they may not occur in any rul.e in L • Thus, by ta.king a suitably 
large alphabet and all finite strings over this alphabet as elements 
of T , we could presumably obtain a common T for a large class 
of formal languages. 
The most significant requirement in our definition of formal 
language concerns the interaction between the syntax and the sernantics. 
We have assumed that the grammatical analysis of a sentence is not 
independent of the sentence's meaning. Therefore, in parsing a sen-
tence, when some grammar rule R applies, we can also apply the 
corresponding semantic transformation TR to determine the meaning 
of the resultant of R • In English, for example, the syntactic entities 
which we call phrases generally are meaningful. strings of words. 
Thus, "the boy on the red bicycle" is a noun phrase and presumably 
denotes some specific individual; whereas the string "boy on'' which 
occurs within the preceding phrase, but is not itself a phrase, seems 
to be meaningless. Another way of looking at this condition involves 
recognizing that there are typically many different grammars which 
will generate a particular set of strings. We are insisting that the 
grammar chosen for a formal language be well-behaved in the sense 
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that the intermediate strings generated by it, which are not sentences, 
must have a sensible interpretation. The fact that a speaker of a 
natural language is able to analyze and ascribe a meaning to a sentence 
he has never heard before lends intuitive support to an analogous view 
for formal languages, since even though the complete sentence is 
novel, presw:nably the words are known, and they are combined in a 
manner conforming to certain familiar rules [ 42]. 
It is very important to realize that the semantic categories 
and semantic transformations of a formal language have been specified 
to be structural in nature, i.e. independent of particular objects in the 
universe. Thus, the set of objects belonging to a given semantic 
category is a subset of all of the objects of S which share certain 
common properties. For instance, we might have a part of speech 
BR which signifies that the members of the corresponding semantic 
category are all to be binary relations. Thus the formula associated 
with BR would be F(x) = vy(yEx -3: u 3: v (y = < u, v >)}, and ex-
amples of grammatical strings having part of speecn BR might be, 
"< " or "is taller than". These strings could be embedded in sen-
tences such as, "3 < 5". or "John is taller than Bob". In any parti-
cular model, the objects belonging to the semantic category CBR 
wouict be given by 
C~ = fxlFM(x)} , 
Where F M(x) denotes the relativization of the formula F(x) to the 
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model M • Thus, the formula F(x) is expressed in terms of the 
predicate E of the language of set theory, and F M(x) indicates 
that this predicate is to be interpreted as the particular £ associ-
ated with M • 
The semantic category C , corresponding to the distin-
cr 
guished part of speech a • is uniquely specified for any formal 
language. That is, by convention, we always associate F(x) = x = 
0 V x = l with the part of speech corresponding to sentence, and 
we identify 0 with "false" and 1 with "true". Consequently, 
following Frege [ 14], a sentence of formal language denotes, or 
has as its extensional meaning, its truth value. I£ the set of de-
notations of the sentence is: 
(i) (O}, the sentence is false; 
(ii) [ 1} , the sentence is true; 
(iii) [O, 1 }', the sentence is ambiguous; 
(iv) ¢ , the sentence is meaningless. 
We shall define the manner in which a sentence denotes its truth value 
and discuss the questions of ambiguity and meaninglessness later in 
this chapter. 
The semantic transformations of a formal language prescribe 
relations which must exist among elements of S , and the domain of a 
sernantic transformation is restricted to those sets having certain 
structural properties. Thus, the semantic transformation ,.R (x1, • • ·, 
)C 
rn' Y l' • • • , y n) , corresponding to the rule of grammar R : a 1a 2 · • • 
-~1'32•··13m , is such that, for any model M , 
Q' 
n 
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{ < xl' • • • ' xm, y l' • • • 'Y n > I T~ (xl' • • • ' xm, Y l' • • • 'y n)} 
M- M M M M 
s: c A x c A x • • • x CA x c x ••• x c 
t-'1 t-'2 t-'m al an 
We will occasionally write < xl' x 2, • • •, xm, y l' · • ·, y n > ET~ to 
indicate that the elements of S identified with the x' s and y' s satisfy 
the semantic transformation TR in the model M .. Therefore. the 
sets operated on by a semantic transformation must belong to the 
isemantic categories specified by the parts of speech participating 
in the corresponding rule of grammar. If, in the course of parsing 
some sentence, we have certain elements of S identified with the 
variables y 1, y 2, • • •, y n in the transformation TR, and there is no 
collection of elements of S corresponding to the x 1, • • • , xm which 
satisfies the conditions of the transformation, then that particular 
parsi~g of the sentence fails on semantic grounds. A special case of 
this is often called a vacuous description, as in "the present king of 
France", which, although it is a grammatical English phrase. fails 
to describe any individual. Similarly, semantic ambiguity results 
if more than one collection of elements corresponds to the variables 
x:1, • • ·, xm, as might occur in the phrase "the wife of Henry VIII". 
The syntax and semantics of a formal language are both 
abstract mathematical entities. Only when they are associated with 
sozne space of realizations do the meanings of strings in the language 
become concrete. Thus, the models ~ , which we have previously 
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discussed, represent various configurations of the actual objects in 
the language's universe of discourse, and the set of maps ! char-
acterizes the association of these objects with words in the language. 
A particular cp E ! will therefore assign to a word w E T , some set 
or sets in S • Notice that the properties of these sets will generally 
vary from model to model, since each :model has a distinct E • In 
much of the following material, we shall assume a fixed interpretation 
cp for a given formal language and hence refer to the interpretation cp. 
Now that we have described some of the salient features of a 
formal language qualitatively, we shall state more formally the mech-
anism which associates meaning with a phrase or sentence. To do 
this, it is necessary to· define the notion of a parse. 
* Definition: For 'Y € T , p = < a0 , al' ••• , an> is a parse of "Y• denoted 
by < "Y• p >, if: 
(i) a0 = (3 1(3 2• • • '3k where '3i- "Yi € L 
and 'Y = "Y1 'Y2 ••• "Yk • 
for i = 1, • • •, k 
(ii) For each i - 1, • • ·, n there are µii, µi 2 , µi 3 ' 
such that: a. 1 = µ. 1µ. 2 µ. 3 , 1- 1 l 1 Ot. = 1 
Utilizing this definition, we can now specify the interpretation 
to be assigned to a particular parse of some string "Y • Therefore, 
let 
where "Y· € T 
1 
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and let 
be a parse of 'Y , cp E' f and M E' rn • 
* * Definition: The interpretation cpM of < 'Y , p > , denoted by ~( 'Y, p) 
is given by 
(i) if p = < ao > = << f31·13z· ••• , {3k >> , and if 
M . * cp('Yi) E' Cf3. for 1 = 1, • • •, k, then cp M(-y, p) = 
1 
(ii) if p = < a 0,al'•••,ah,ah+l >, h+l s: n, and 
a =~~·••Aµ•••µ 1111•••11 h lZ ml r lZ t 
I I 
a =~~···~ µ•••µ v v•••v h+l 1 2 m I s 1 2 t 
<x ,•••,x ,y , ••• ,y ,z1, ••• ,zt>E 1 m 1 r 
(iii) otherwise ~~( 'Y• p) = ¢ • 
We now show that it is possible to associate a unique formula of 
~ * e language of set theory with an interpretation q:>M( 'Y• p) • 
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)'( 
Lemma: Let 'Y = 'Yi ,,.2• • • 'Yh € T' and p = < a 0 , ••·,an> a parse of 
'Y, an= '3 1 '32• • • '3k, M €ti\. Then there is a formula F(x1, • •• , ~, 
yl' • • •, yk) of the language of set theory such that: there are 
):( 
<al'••·, ak > Ecp M( 'Y• p) if and only if F(x1, • • •, "h• y I'···, yk) 
holds for < cp(,,.1), • • •, cp('Yh)' a 1, • • •, ak > in M. 
Proof: (i) if p = < a0 > , then h = k and (3i -'Yi EL • Hence, 
cp)~(-y, p) = { < cp ( ,.,1 ), • • • , cp( 'Yh) > } if and only if 
' ) M [ I '3i( ) } b d £• • • £ >:c cp\'Yi E C(3. = x FM x , y the e in1tlon o cpM. 
1 
Now, consider the formula F(x1, • • • '~· YI'•••' Y h) = 
'31 '32 (3h 
F ( x 1 ) A F ( x 2 > " • • • A F ( "h > " ( x 1 = y 1 > " • • • /\ < "h = y h > • 
~c 
Clearly, <a1, •••,ah> E cpM(-y, p) if and only if F M(x1, • • •, 
~'yl'•••,yh) holds for <cp('Y1),•••,cp(-yh),a1, 0 ••,ah >. 
.. . --- -,--(11) if p = <ao, · · · ,ai,O!i+l >,and ai=A.µv,ai+l =A.µ v 
where x, µ, ;;r' v €P):(. R: N € G and H(x, u, y, v) is the 
~( 
formula of set theory associated with cpM(-y, < a0 , ···,a?), 
i. e. <a' b' c > € cp~ ( 1'' < (l'o ' ••• ' ai >) if and 
only if HM(x, u, y, v) holds for < Cf'(')"}, a, b, c > • 
cp( -y) denotes cp( -y), cp( -y), • • • , cp( -yh) • Suppose G(z, y) 
is the formula of set theory corresponding to ,.R , i.e. 
M{--, --} TR= <z, y> Gm(z, y) • Now consider the formula 
F(X, U, Z, V) = :3: Y {H(X, U, y, V) A G(Z, Yl) and note 
that< a, CI, c > E cp~( -y, p) if and only if there are l> 
such that <a, o, c > €cp~(j1, < ao, ... , '\ > ) and 
<CI, b'> ET~. 
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But this is true if and only if there are b such that 
HM(x, u, y, v) /\ GM(z, y) holds when x = cp( ')') , 
u = a, y = b, v = c, and z = d . And by definition 
this holds if and only if F M(x, u, z, v) holds for 
< cp( -y), a, d, c > • Therefore F is the desired 
formula, and the lemma is proved. 
):( 
Theorem: Let 'Y = -y1')'2 • •• ,,h € T , and pa parse of 'Y to a, i.e. 
P = < a0 , <l'l' • • •, <l'n > where an = < cr > • Then there is a formula 
F(xl' x2' • • •, ~· y) of the language of set theory such that: 
>:c 
a€ cpM(-y, p) if and only if F M(x1, x 2, • • •, ~, y) holds 
for <cp(-y1),•••,cp(-yh),a >where a= OM or a= lM. 
Proof: Follows directly from the preceding lemma and the fact 
M 
that C 0 = [ OM, lM} , where OM and lM denote the "0" and 
"1" of the model M of set theory. 
We shall now characterize the conditions under which a sentence 
is ambiguous, either syntactically or semantically. 
),': 
Suppose 'Y e: T , 
and p. , i € I is a parse of 'Y to a , i.e. 'Y is a sentence of the formal 
1 
language. 
~finition: The sentence 'Y is semantically ambiguous on a given 
model M € tn, if for some p. , i € I 
1 
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Definition: The sentence I' is syntactically ambiguous for a given 
model M , if for some p., p. ; i, j € I 
1 J 
Examples of sentences which are either syntactically or seman-
tically ambiguous are easy to find. Thus, in English. "They are flying 
planes" is an often used illustration of a sentence which is syntactically 
ambiguous. Similarly, the statement Z = ~ can be considered to 
be semantically ambiguous since we do not know whether ~ denotes 
+ 2 or - Z • When we say that the above two statements are ambiguous, 
we really mean that they are ambiguous from the standpoint of most 
English speakers. That is, they are ambiguous with respect to models 
or configurations of the universe admitted by these speakers. However, 
it should be obvious that a given sentence I' may be ambiguous in one 
formal language and unambiguous in another. This is certainly the 
case in natural languages, also, since ambiguity may depend on factors 
such as the speaker 1 s context or environment, or his previous experi-
ence. 
In the following discussion, we shall temporarily ignore the 
question of ambiguity in order to simplify the explanations somewhat. 
* ):( Under this restriction, we have cpM( ,,, p) = ~(I') , which may assume 
any one of the values [ 0}, [ 1 } , or ¢ • Thus, given a sentence I' and 
a Inodel M € rn I we have the following cases: 
(i) I' is true for M if and only if cp~(,,) = [ 1} , which 
is equivalent to FM( x 1, • • • , "b.• y) holds for < cp( ,,1), 
••• I cp(,,h), I >. 
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>:c:: (ii) 'Y is false for M if and only if q:>M('Y) = {O} , 
which is equivalent to F M(x1, • • · , "h.• y) holds 
for < ct>( 'Y 1), • • • , cp( 'Yh) , 0 > • 
(iii) 'Y is meaningless for M, if q:>)~('Y) = ¢ , which 
is equivalent to -, :H: y F M(x1, • • •, ~· y) holds for 
< cp( 'Yi),• • • , cp ("Yh) '> • This points out a useful 
corollary to the preceding theorem. 
Corollary: For a sentence 'Y = 'Yi 'Yz• • • 'Yh and a model M , there is 
* a formula. G(x1, • • •, ~) such that q:> M( 'Y) i: ¢ if and only if GM(x1, 
• • • , "b_) holds for < cp ( 'Y 1), • • • , cp ( 'Yh) > • 
Proof: G( XI' ••• ' "h) = a y F( xl' ••• ' "h· y) 
The formula GM(x1, • • •, ~) in the corollary holds for the sets 
denoted by cp (,.,1), • • •, cp(,.,h) exactly in the case where 'Y is a mean-
ingful sentence. But if 'Y is not a meaningful sentence, what then? 
The -general problems caused by admitting that some grammatical 
strings of a language r.nay fail to convey any meaning have troubled 
many logicians and linguists. As a consequence, a variety of ex-
planations and solutions have been proposed. In almost all cases, 
however, meaningless sentences are treated in a rather ad hoc 
fashion. It is our contention that such sentences may be incorporated 
Within the framework of a formal language in a much more natural 
tnanner. Further, it is quite necessary to do so in order to explicate 
the issues raised in the introduction. The implications of our approach 
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will become more apparent in chapter IV when we discuss the question 
of probability. 
Consider the sentence, "Green ideas sleep furiously. ", an 
example proposed by Chomsky [5, p. 15] of a sentence which, although 
grammatical in English, would generally be said to be meaningless. 
Chomsky' 5 method of handling such a ::sentence is to require that the 
grammar of the language be sufficiently powerful to exclude this as a 
grammatical string. [7, chap. 2] • This seems to be undesirable for 
several reasons. First of all, to attempt to eliminate all meaningless 
sentences on syntactic grounds alone will necessarily cause the grammar 
of the language to become increasingly complex, since such strings must 
fail to parse completely. Furthermore, the syntax of a language may 
be unable to accomplish this because the exclusion of such strings may 
depend upon the specific meanings of particular words and not simply on 
grosser structural classes to which they belong. Thus, in the limit, we 
could conceivably be forced to assign a separate part of speech to every 
referent word, thereby rendering the syntax useless as a general set of 
rules for sentence formation. One form of syntactic analysis which 
inherently involves this problem is co-occurrence ana.lysis [ 18 J • This 
involves examining grammatical strings of the language to determine 
When one word may be substituted in a string for another without 
destroying grammaticalness of the string. 
This brief discussion does point out one particularly interesting 
fact about the structures of languages in general, and our formal 
languages in particular. That is, there will typically be a trade-off 
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between the syntactic and semantic components of a language. We 
may be able to make one more powerful while letting the other be-
come weaker and still preserve essentially the same set of meaning-
ful sentences. Within certain limits, this is certainly possible, but 
in the extreme, the language will lose its intuitive relation to reality. 
Thus~ the s ernantic categories of a formal language are intended to 
correspond to generic classes of perceivable entities, and the char-
acterization of these classes may depend upon non-linguistic con-
siderations involving the speaker's experience. Therefore, although 
this trade-off may be theoretically arbitrary, in realistic situations, 
it would not seem to be so. 
In English, for example, the distinctions between an animate 
noun and an inanimate noun are extremely difficult to articulate. We 
must draw on a great deal of our knowledge about the world to char-
acterize these two classes of entities. If, in a formal language, we 
attempt to discriminate these on a syntactic basis, then the associated 
semantic categories will be characterized by extremely complex set-
theoretic relations, or possibly these concepts are not even struc-
turally expressible. In the latter case, they would not be appropriate 
notions for a formal language, since we demand that the syntax and 
semantics should be clearly delineated and that the syntactic aspects 
be purely structural. It is important to realize that the semantic 
categories of a language are fundamental to the entire semantic 
structure of the language. They represent atomic classes of entities 
Which share certain generic structural properties, and the semantic 
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transformations can be considered to be explicitly developed or 
constructed on them. Thus the semantic categories embody the 
deeper aspects of the semantics, and since they are in a one-to-one 
correspondence with the parts of speech, their number and com-
plexity directly affects the grammar. Additional ramification of 
semantic categories rnay result in a simplification of the grammar, 
but this occurs because certain relationships which were previously 
explicit in the grammar, now have become implicit in the deep 
structure of the semantics. 
Another circwnstance in which a sentence may be meaning-
less is when it contains a vacuous description, as we mentioned 
previously, for example, "The present king of France is bald". 
Russell [32 J takes the view that such a sentence should be considered 
meaningful but false. The difficulty with this analysis is that it is not 
clear just how negation is to be handled. To say that the above sen-
tence is false is to say either that there is no present king of France 
or that he is not bald. This strains normal English usage and by so 
doing confowids the very task we have set ourselves. Similar remarks 
hold for other proposed solutions that make such sentences "meaningful". 
In our scheme, however, if a sentence is true of some model, then the 
negation of that sentence is false of that model, provided that the 
negation of the sentence is expressible within the formal language. In 
a 6 Unilar fashion, the negation of a meaningless sentence will also be 
meaningless. Recall that the extended interpretation cp'~ of a string 
Which is not meaningful is null, i.e. denotes the empty set of the model 
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of set theory M • This is related to the approaches adopted by 
Quine, Frege, and Carnap. For a discussion of their viewpoints 
on this problem, see Carnap [4, chap. I]. 
One very important distinction inherent in our method is that 
we explicitly deal with a collection of models th • Thus a sentence 
may be meaningless for one model but meaningful for another. For 
instance, in the previous example, if it is not "known'' whether or 
not France currently has a king then there will presumably be ad-
missible models for which the sentence asserting that the king is 
bald is meaningless and other models for which the sentence is 
true or false. This question of "knowing" some fact will be expli-
cated by our notion of observation which is discussed in the following 
chapter. However, it is sufficient at this point to realize that sen-
tences of a formal language will generally be true of some models, 
false of others, and meaningless or ambiguous on still others. A 
further difference is that if a description or phrase of the language 
does not denote a unique entity, we consider the sentence in which 
the description is embedded as ambiguous, whereas Carnap, for 
example, says that such a sentence is meaningless. Thus for a 
Inodel possessing two kings of France both of whom were bald, we 
Would say that the sentence "The present king of France is bald" is 
true of the model, assuming the sentence has only two distinct inter-
Pretations. 
The use of quantification in the statements of a language raises 
sozne rather subtle problems, as indicated by Quine [30, p. 13 J • 
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For instance, if V x P(x) is a statement of the predicate calculus, 
then the range of the bound variable x is assumed to be over all 
objects in the universe of discourse. In this case, the world which 
the language speaks about is essentially homogeneous, i.e. all 
objects belong to the same structural class. In our formal languages, 
as in all natural languages, the total collection of entities referred to 
does not have this property. In a formal language, the semantic 
categories partition the universe of discourse into distinct classes. 
Consider the statement "There is an x such that x is red". What 
objects are potentially represented by x ? Certainly not every 
element of the universe of discourse, since things like "ideas" are 
meaningless in this context. How are such things excluded? By the 
definitions of semantic categories and transformations for a formal 
language, the range of a quantifier is over exactly those entities in 
some semantic category. Thus, in the preceding example, x might 
denote any object whose part of speech was concrete noun. Observe 
that there may still be many objects in the semantic category which 
are not in the range of cp , i.e. are not named in the language, al-
though they possess the generic structural properties of the objects 
Which do have names. A similar situation exists for negative state-
rnents such as "That is not a book". Here again, the object referred 
to is not completely arbitrary but must belong to the same semantic 
category as books do. Thus many of the problems associated with the 
range of quantifiers are handled simply by formalizing the notion that 
the universe of discourse of a language is not homogeneous. 
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We mentioned briefly in the preceding discussion that a language 
might not be able to express both a sentence and its negation. That is, 
the language may not include any symbol or string of symbols which 
are always interpreted as "not''. In general, the set of referent words 
T of a language may be quite arbitrarily mapped by an interpretation 
cp into the elements of S • Therefore, if the syrnbol "•" appears in 
T , there may be interpretations c:p which do not associate the c us -
tomary meaning of "not" with this symbol. In the case of this parti-
cular symbol, however, we have already implicitly presumed an 
understanding of its meaning in our basic ontological assumptions. 
The reason for this is that we formulated the axioms of set theory, 
which define the admissible models in terms of the first-order 
predicate calculus. Thus, symbols such as "•", "/\ ", "v'', "V", 
and 11 3:" appear in the underlying axioms of our system of models, 
and we have tacitly assumed that, for example, in the set-theoretic 
for:rnuJ.a F(x) = G(x) /\ H(x) , the symbol "/\"has a well-defined 
interpretation. As a consequence, if we have a formal language 
Which is incapable of expressing these basic logical concepts, then 
this language would seem to be somewhat pathologicaL Of course, a 
for:rnai language which does include a logical notion such as "not" 
wil.J. not necessarily associate this with the symbol "•"· In English, 
for example, we can generally negate a sentence 'Y by saying "It is 
not the case that 'Y ". 
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One other minor point regarding our formal language definition 
is that we have assumed that the entire terminal vocabulary T con-
sists of referent words. Note, however, that the entities denoted by 
the interpretations of the words are not required to participate mean-
ingfully in the semantic transformations. For instance, the elements 
associated with words such as "the" or "an" could act essentially as 
dummy arguments, and their semantic categories would possess some 
correspondingly trivial properties. Words of this character are some-
times called function words and treated in a special fashion, but there 
is no reason for doing this in our formalization. 
At this time, we return to the conditions of adequacy for a for-
mal language, which were stated earlier in this chapter, and show 
that our concept of a formal language satisfies them. 
Theorem: A formal language S:, satisfies the conditions of adequacy: 
(i) The set of sentences g of £ is recursively 
enwnerable over T • 
(ii) For any set of sentences e of S., e c g , the 
logical consequences of e are recursively 
enumerable over e. 
Proof: ( i) The quadruple < TU P, T, L U G, a > is a syntax for 
S., • It is equivalent to an unrestricted rewriting 
system and therefore the set of strings of sentences 
generated by it is recursively enwnerable. [ 6, p. 358 J. 
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(ii) Suppose we have a set of sentences e of S, and 
a sentence "Y which is a logical consequence of 
e , i. e. for every Mc th , if cp)~( "Y') = [ 1 } for 
I ):c [ J 
"Y c e , then cp M('Y) = 1 • We must show that 
there is a constructive procedure by which we 
can prove 'Y starting with the set of sentences 
e . We have previously demonstrated that for 
any sentence 'Y , there is a formula F'Y of the 
language of set theory which holds if and only if 
"Y is true, i. e. when cp)~( -y) = [ 1 } • A careful 
review of that proof will establish that the pas sage 
from 'Y to Fi' is constructive, indeed depending 
entirely on the constructive character of the 
grammar. Let Jr be the set of such formulas 
_corresponding to e 1 and let F'Y be the formula 
corresponding to 'Y • By the definition of logical 
I 
consequence, for every ME' rh , if F~ holds for 
' F'Y e: Jf, then F~ holds. Therefore by virtue of 
the Godel completeness theorem for the first 
order predicate calculus, F'Y is provable from ..fr. 
(See Lyndon [23, p. 56] , for an appropriate form 
of this theorem.) Consequently, there is a con-
structive procedure which determines that 'Y is a 
logical consequence of e , and the logical con-
sequences of e are thus recursively enwnerable 
with respect to e . 
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Notice that the preceding theorem does not yield a method of 
proof for the language t in general, since the procedure for enu-
merating the logical consequences of a set of sentences e may de-
pend upon the nature of e . The following corollary shows that we 
can obtain a procedure which is independent of e . 
Corollary: For any formal language l. , there is a method of proof 
for S, , i.e. a procedure such that for any set of sentences e , the 
logical consequences of e are recursively enwnerable with respect 
to e , using this procedure. 
Proof: The requirement here is that the enwneration procedure ob-
tained in the preceding theorem be uniformly recursive over the set 
of sentences g , in the sense of Kleene [20, p. 233 J • To see this, 
note that the method for deriving the set of formulas ,j, from e is 
independent of the constituents of e . That is, for a string 'YET , 
the derivation of cp ~c( 'Y) and hence F'Y is constructive and does not 
depend upon the properties of e . Furthermore, if a sentence 'Y is 
a logical consequence of e, i.e. F'Y is provable from 1' by our 
theorem, then this proof procedure uses only the rules of inference of 
the predicate calculus, and consequently is independent of the nature 
of Jr and F"Y • Therefore, the complete procedure for making the 
Passage from e and 'Y to 3' and F'Y, and the subsequent proof of 
F'Y from ~ is independent of e . Hence, the enwneration procedure 
is uniformly recursive over g and thus the logical consequences of a 
Bet of sentences e are recursively enwnerable by it. 
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Even though a method of proof for a language exists, there 
may be no constructive procedure for determining the actual rules of 
interference which it comprises. That our proof does not give a 
constructive way to find such procedures results from the use of 
the axiom of choice in the proof of Godel 1 s completeness theorem. 
Furthermore. the rnethod need not involve any of the cornrnonly 
accepted rules, such as modus ponens, which are associated with 
ordinary logic. Nevertheless the notions of provability and logical 
consequence become synonymous, even though in any particular case 
one may not be able to find them. 
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III. OBSERVATIONS 
A basic concept of science is that of an observation. Obser-
vations are the means by which scientific theories are either confirmed 
or refuted; they provide the connection between the reality of the world 
around us and the abstract statements of our theories. In science, we 
often think of observations as resulting from the performance of some 
experiment. More generally, however, individuals make observations 
of the events and phenomena they continually perceive, not necessarily 
in connection with some well-defined experiment. We shall be con-
cerned with characterizing observations in this broader sense, and in 
this chapter we will develop a precise notion of observation and consider 
its relationship to formal languages. 
Suppose, for example, that an individual points to some collection 
of physical objects and exclaims, "Look, the cup is on the table". Is 
this what we mean by an observation? Although it may be tempting to 
say yes, more careful examination indicates that this is merely the 
observer's interpretation of the relationship existing among certain 
objects which he perceives. The words the observer uses to express 
what he sees are determined by his language. We shall treat obser-
vations as extra-linguistic phenomena, and therefore they will be in-
dependent of any particular formal language. Notice that this permits 
two individuals to observe the same event and each describe the 
occurrence differently. 
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We have made the basic ontological assumption that the 
universe is set-theoretic in nature, and we will make further use of 
this assumption in formulating our definition of observation. Thus, 
we shall presume that any perceivable relation among objects in the 
universe can be expressed within the language of set theory. This 
is not to say that an individual translates what he sees., eithe-r con-
sciously or unconsciously, into set-theoretic notions, but rather that 
his perception can be expressed in these terms at the meta-level. 
Now, assuming that observations can be defined somehow within the 
framework of set theory, are there any restrictions on the character 
of this definition? One reasonable constraint is to require that a 
single observation include only a finite number of objects. Notice 
that this does not presuppose anything about the complexity of the 
relationships that may be perceived among these objects. 
Before presenting our definition of observation, let us briefly 
examine some of the conditions which have traditionally been accepted 
as restrictions on what is actually observable. Russell [ 34], for 
example, maintains that it is impossible to perceive that "one of these 
roads leads to Rome", or that "either John or Bob is over six feet 
tall". The problem here is the disjunction implicit in these obser-
vations; thus, in the first case, we can only perceive that some 
specific road leads to Rome. Similarly, quantification and negation 
appear to introduce problems. To observe that "the book is not red", 
for instance, would not be possible since in order to do this we must 
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perceive that the book is, say, blue. Also, the observation "all men 
are mortal" would be ruled out on the grounds that we can never 
actually observe all men. We do not wish to take direct issue with 
these arguments of Russell's, since they are intuitively plausible, at 
least in the case of normal human observers. On the other hand, 
they are not gerrnain to the analysis we shall pl"esent. Therefore, we 
shall not be bound by these restrictions, and we will consider obser-
vations as a somewhat more general phenomenon. By so doing, we 
leave open the possibility that an observer could make an "observ-
ation" by receiving a communication from some individual whan he 
considers to be very reliable. Also, we might visualize some non-
human observer such as a computer whose sensory inputs and per-
ceptive capabilities are different from those of humans. 
The following definition associates a formula and a collection 
of objects with an observation, and these, in conjunction, act to char-
acterize a set of models. 
Definition~ An observation 0:::: <F(x1 , •.• , xn), ap • • o, an> where 
F(x1, • • •, xn) is a formula of the language of set theory and a 1, •••,an 
are objects, i. e. , a. € S. 
1 
Intuitively we think of the observation < F(x1, · • ·, xn), 
a 1, ••·,an > as the perception that the objects a 1, • ··,an are in the 
relationship specified by the formula F(x1, • • • , xn). For a given 
model or configuration of the universe, either the objects a 1, ···,an 
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will have the structure required by F(x1, • • •, xn) or they will not, 
according as the relativized formula F M(x1, • • •, xn) holds or does 
not hold for a 1, •••,an. Therefore, let 
be the set of models, lh O ~th , associated with the observation 0. 
Note particularly that the formula F(x1, • • •, xn) may contain other 
variables y 1, • • •, yk which are not free in F but are bound by 
quantifiers. Thus, the x' s correspond explicitly to specific objects, 
while the y' s are implicitly associated with related objects, not ex-
plicitly perceived. We emphasize that tn0 is not identical to the set 
of models satisfying the formula 3: x 1 3: x 2 • • • 3: xn F( x 1, • • • , xn) • For 
any model, this formula merely asserts the existence of some arbitrary 
collection of objects in that model related in the manner specified by 
F( x 1, • • • , xn) • The models in rn0 , on the other hand, are required to 
have this relationship among particular objects, which themselves may 
not be able to be characterized set-theoretically. Thus, it is only the 
relationship that is observed to exist among objects which is set-
theoretically specified. The objects actually observed in th.at relation-
ship are a quite separate aspect of the observation. 
Suppose MO E tn is the true model, i.e., MO represents the 
actual configuration of the objects in S. Normally, we would expect 
that for an observation O, M0 E' tn 0 ; however, this is not guaranteed 
in any way by our definition since 'Ve have not required that every 
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observation be true of the real world. We arc thus free to sp<!ak of 
possible observations, as for example in considering the possible 
outcomes of an experiment. 
If we have several observations, then under what circumstances 
would we say that they are consistent? Intuitively we feel that this is 
so if there are possible configurations of the universe for which every 
observation is true. We state this condition formally. 
Definition: A set of observations n is consistent if 
Suppose that an observer makes a very large number of obser-
vations which are consistent. Each new observation he makes, which 
is consistent with his previous experience, delimits a smaller set of 
models or possible configurations of the universe. Eventually, at 
least in this hypothetical case, he arrives at a single model M € th. 
If this is the true model M0 , then he "knows" the complete structure 
of S • 
Theorem: A maximal set of consistent observations n defines a 
unique model M E tn • 
Proof: Suppose this is not the case, i.e., let n define h ~ tn where 
M, M 1 Eh. Thus, M = < S, E > and M' = < S, E' >, where the binary 
relations E and £ 1 are not identical. Hence, there are objects a, 
b € S such that "a £ b" and 11-, a £ 1 b" • Therefore the observation 
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0 = < F(x1, x 2 ) , a, b > where F(x1, x 2) ;; x 1 £ x2 is such that ME tn0 
and M' Elno. Clearly, the set of observations n U { 0} is consistent. 
This is a contradiction, therefore n defines a unique model. 
If we have two sets of observations, perhaps associated with 
different observers, we would like to know wider what conditions 
these two sets of observations can be considered to be related. The 
concept of relatedness is independent of consistency and only depends 
upon whether the two sets of observations have in common some 
specific objects, together with particular structural relations among 
them. 
Definition: Two sets of observations n1 , n2 , are related if either 
(i) The set of observations n1 U n2 is not consistent. 
(ii) There are non-empty n~, n~, such that n~ i;; n1 , 
n~ ~ 02 and 
or vice-versa. 
mo ~ 
1 
Condition ( i) of this definition states that two sets of observations are 
related if they are in basic conflict. This seems intuitively reasonable 
since they will not disagree unless one requires the existence of a 
structure among some set of objects which the other refutes. Thus, 
they will be related by virtue of the common objects they reference, 
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even though they may not agree on the structural interrelationships 
among them. Condition (ii) says that if two sets of observations are 
consistent, they are related only if some subset of one necessarily 
implies that certain of the observations of the other are valid. Notice 
that this concept is very similar to that of logical consequence. How-
ever, since we know nothing about whether these observations are 
expressible in a language, that terminology is inapplicable. Suppose 
we observed that "grass is green" and that "snow is white". These 
two observations are clearly consistent but are unrelated and might 
be said to be independent of one another. This suggests that independence 
of sets of observations is the converse of relatedness. It is worth men-
tioning that if the sets of observations each consist of many distinct 
elements, then they may either be related in a trivial way or a large 
percentage of the individual observations may be correlated. 
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IV. PROBABILITY AND INFORMATION 
Using the concept of an observation, together with our defi-
nition of formal language, we shall now develop an information 
measure. As previously indicated, a formal language will be con-
sidered to characterize an individual's view of some particular 
domain, and thus the information measure we obtain will be sub-
jective in nature. This notion of a non-objective definition of in-
formation is in sharp contrast with the classical information the-
oretic approach in which the purpose is to develop methods for 
studying the problems of communication networks and the coding of 
signals [3 7, 19 J. Thus, in information theory, the informational 
content of a sentence from today's newspaper might be equal to that 
of a sentence stating Fermat's last theorem on the basis that the 
relative probability of occurrence of the groups of letters contained 
in each was the same. Nevertheless, we shall make use of many 
of the criteria established by information theory in formulating our 
definition of a subjective measure of information. The fundamental 
difference in our approach involves the characterization of the 
probability. We shall be concerned with probability primarily in 
the sense of degree of belief, and we will demonstrate that such a 
probability arises naturally from considerations of the manner in 
which a formal language structures its universe of discourse. 
We have previously introduced the notion that rn , the col-
lection of models of set theory, represents all possible configurations 
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of the universe. That is, given only the basic ontology of set theory, 
each model ME' rn expresses a possible structure among the objects 
of the universe, i.e. the elements of S • However, a given formal 
language will impose additional structure on rn in a manner reflect-
ing the logic of that language. Suppose, for example, that two mod-
els Ml, Mz £Th differ only with regard to the propertie~ of some 
object b . Then if S. is a formal language which does not refer to 
b , either explicitly or implicitly, we expect that M 1 and M2 
will be identified as equivalent configurations of S relative to S, • 
At this point, it would perhaps be useful to clarify the notion 
of the "logic" of a language and its relation to provability. A funda-
mental concept in this regard is that of implication. Unfortunately, 
however, this seemingly intuitive idea has been modified, extended, 
and restricted in a myriad of differing ways in the literature. Part 
of the confusion is due to the fact that we are dealing with several 
languages-namely the meta-language, the language of set theory, 
and our object languages or formal languages- each of which may 
possess a different kind of implication. Suppose, for example, that 
the symbol "'.:)" occurs in the object language. That is, A :::::> B is 
a legitimate sentence of the object language, where A and B are 
also sentences. Then, "-:::>" is material implication if the sentence 
A ~ B is true if and only if either B is true or A is false. Another 
possibility is that "~" is strict implication. This notion is not well 
defined in the literature but is generally associated with modal logic. 
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It is usually construed to mean that the interpretation of A:::::> B in-
volved some substantive relation between the interpretations of A 
and B . Thus, one can not decide the interpretation of A::> B by 
examining either A or B alone. In English, we might say that, 
"Grass is green" materially implies "Snow is white", but this 
would not be an example of strict implication since these are pre-
sumably unrelated truths. 
Now consider the meta-linguistic statement A "implies" 
B , where A and B are sentences of the object language. We 
stress that this in no way presupposes the existence of an object 
language symbol for implication of any kind. Again, there are 
several possible interpretations of this statement. One of the 
most common is analogous to our definition of logical consequence; 
that is, B is true of all models where A is true. This is frequent-
ly written as A t= B • However, we might also mean that B is some-
how provable from A • The notion of proof is generally assumed to be 
syntactic in nature and consequently only involves some process of 
symbol manipulation. The proof procedure must be specified by some 
set of inference rules describing how a proof may be constructed, but 
these rules need not be based on implication, or such familiar in-
ference rules as modus ponens. The statement A "implies" B in 
this sense of proof is often written as A f- B . Our second condition 
of adequacy for a formal language essentially requires that these two 
notions of implication coincide relative to the meta-language. Hence, 
for our formal languages, AF B if and only if A\-- B . 
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Since these two notions are thus equivalent for formal lan-
guages, one can characterize the logic of a formal language either 
semantically or syntactically. Notice that a rich interrelationship 
structure may exist among the sentences of a language independent 
of which possible state of the universe entails. Implication of the 
type A t= B embodies these relationships. Formal languages then 
are precisely those languages where this underlying logic is con-
structively definable in terms of symbol manipulation, or formal 
syntaxes. 
We now wish to investigate in detail how a formal language 
imposes structure on its universe of discourse. The fundamental 
idea here is that the syntax and semantics of the language together 
with the interpretation cp establish a correspondence between sen-
tences of the language and certain sets of models contained in rn • 
The result of this is a partitioning of rn into disjoint subsets each 
of which is definable by some collection of formulas of set theory. 
These partition sets, however, do not have equivalent status with 
respect to the formal language, even though they are all equally 
well-defined at the meta-level. To explicate this distinction, we 
introduce the two basic notions of an element and a state of a for-
mal language. Our definitions are given in terms of the meaning 
or truth value of a sentence on a model M €th • Recall that given 
a sentence 'Y € 8 , then for any model M € rn, 'Y is either true, false 
or meaningless on M. 
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Definition: Given a set g• ~ g of sentences of £, the element 
h determined by gr is the maximal set of models such that for 
~, M 2 E h, 'Y E g• either: 
( 1) 'Y is true for both ~ and M 2, 
( 2) 'Y is false for both M1 and M 2, 
(3) 'Y is meaningless for both Mi and M 2• 
Definition: Given a set g• ~ g of sentences of S., the ~ h 
determined by gi is the maximal set of models such that for ~­
M2 E h, 'Y E g• either: 
( 1) 'Y is true for both ~ and M 2 , 
(2) 'Y is false for both ~ and M 2 
We will say that the set of sentences g• defines the state h • 
It follows immediately from these definitions that each state 
is also an element, but in general not every element is a state. This 
fundamental distinction will be discussed in detail subsequently, but 
first we identify two common instances of a state. 
Lemma: For any language S. , the entire set of models tn is a state, 
and if negation is expressible within £ , the empty set of models <P 
is also a state. 
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Proof: In the definition of a state let g• ::: ¢ , the null set of sen-
tences. g• clearly defines th • Hence In is a state. Now assume 
that if "Y is a sentence of S. , then '"Y (the negation of i') is also 
a sentence of S. • Let g' = [ i', 'i'] . Obviously, g' defines the 
empty state ¢ • 
The concepts of element and state are fundamental to an 
understanding of the material that follows. We will therefore at-
tempt to convey their intuitive meanings. The speaker of a formal 
language deals exclusively with states. A state is a collection 0£ 
models which can be directly characterized or defined by enunci-
ating some set of sentences of the language. These sentences there-
by specify a configuration of the universe which can be recognized or 
described within the speaker's language, and for any given model 
M E rn , either the structure specified by the sentences exists in that 
model or it does not. Consider the set consisting of all the states 
of a language; it defines every configuration of the universe which 
the language can express. 
Notice that it is possible that two distinct sets of sentences, 
g' and S'' define the same state h • In order to characterize this 
case conveniently, we introduce the notion of logical equivalence. 
Thus, two sets of sentences gr and gr' will be said to be logically 
equivalent ifthey define the same state. Recalling our previous 
discussion of implication, this clearly means that every sentence 
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of 3' is a logical consequence of g", and vice-versa. Further-
more, our second condition of adequacy for a formal language 
requires that the sentences of either set be provable from the sen-
tences of the other. 
An element of a language is an extra-linguistic concept, 
since in general the speaker 0£ the language has no precise way of 
characterizing it. This is because some of the sentences which 
are used to define the element may be meaningless on all of the 
models which constitute the element. At the meta-level, of course 
elements and states are both defined by formulas of extended set 
theory and are therefore conceptually the same. But the speaker 
of a formal language can only assert the truth or falsity of a sen-
tence, not that a sentence is meaningless. We shall make use of 
the definition of the elements of a language to simplify the notions 
of probability and information, but it is important to bear in mind 
that elements are not generally describable within the formal lan-
guage. 
Suppose we now consider two states of some formal language 
S. a That is, we enunciate the sentences g• and gn II where gr de-
fines the state h' and g" defines the state h" • We then ask a 
speaker of the language t which of these two configurations of the 
universe, or states, he considers most likely to describe the actual 
situation. His answer to this question should reflect his subjective 
view of the relative probabilities of the two states. If we imagine 
that we could continue this process for all pairs of states describable 
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in his formal language, it seems that we would then have char-
acterized, at least roughly, his view of the world relative to the 
formal language. Savage [35] approaches the question of prob-
ability in a similar fashion and defines what he calls a personalistic 
probability, which is used to formulate a theory of decision making. 
Now what isi the basis for our speaker's answers? Certainly they 
are affected by previous experience or observations, but we shall 
be most interested in his answer to questions for which he has no 
directly applicable .observational data. His assignment of a degree 
of belief or probability to two states which can not be discriminated 
on the basis of previous observations will be indicative of his meta-
physical assumptions about the world. 
In general we can conceive of a set of observations which 
would be true on exactly those models which are defined by some 
set of sentences of a formal language. That is, the models satis-
fying the observations coincide with some state. It therefore seems 
quite natural to assume that an observer can assign some probability 
to an observation. This can be interpreted in the sense of expecta-
tion. i.e. the likelihood of observini a certain structure among ob-
jects in the universe. We have stressed that an observation is in-
dependent of language. Hence, the assignment of a probability to an 
observation is not directly related to the observer's ability to express 
that observation in some formal language. Rather, it specifies the 
observer's metaphysics and could be considered to be a part of his 
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ontology. We shall now state in precise terms our assumption that 
an observer can assign some probability to an observation. 
Let a be the class of all observations, that is, the class 
of all sets definable by formulas of extended set theory. For 
rn 0 Ea. mo = (MI for some formula F(xl t ••• I xn) of extended 
set theory and some collection of objects a 1• ··•.an€ S • 
F M(x1, • • ·, xn) holds } • 
Given the class of sets (2. , consider the a-algebra gen-
erated by a... ' denoted by a . a is closed under the formation of 
countable unions and complements, and therefore is also closed 
under the formation of countable intersections. a is a a-algebra 
on tn, since th EQ by taking as the formula F some theorem of 
set theory. We then postulate the probability P as a measure on 
the a-algebra Q,, such that P(fn) = 1 • The requirement that P 
be a measure means that: 
( 1) P( ¢) = 0 , 
( 3) For any sequence of sets [h.} such that 
1 
h. ri h k = ¢ for j # k , P(O \) = f' P( hi) • 
J 1=1 f;1 
Thus, P satisfies the axioms of classical probability theory. 
When we first introduced the notion of a probability, we referred to 
the probability as signed to a state of some formal language. In the 
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course of defining this probability, we will make use of the prob-
ability P , which will be called the observer's a priori probability. 
At a minimum, we would like to know that any state is P-measurable, 
or measurable in the Caratheodory sense. Every member of U 
is measurable in this sense, therefore it is sufficient to ensure that 
any statel for an arbitrary formal language, belongs to a . 
Lemma: Given a formal language ! and a state h of S... h €a 
and hence is P-measurable. 
Proof: Let g• r= g be the set of sentences defining rL • 8' is clearly 
countable. For each 'YE gr , let F'Y (x, y) be the formula of extended 
set theory corresponding to 'Y' where x =a' the set of elements of 
S denoted by the referent words of 'Y , and y = 0 if 'Y is false of 
every ME h ; y = 1 if 'Y is true of every ME h • Let 
fT'Y = [MI Fri(x, y) holds for x =a' y as above} • 
By definition, lnF'Y i:C2. for each 'Y i: g• , and therefore n, lnF'Y i: a . 
1'E" g 
But h = n lnF'Y by the definition of state. Hence h E Ci and is 
'Y ES.1 
P-measurable. 
Having established the concept of an observer's a priori prob-
ability, we now wish to define a relation which is fundamental to an 
understanding of the structure imposed by a formal language on its 
universe of discourse. The question is, under what conditions can a 
- 61 -
language distinguish between two different configurations of the 
universe? That is, any two distinct models actually represent 
different configurations of the universe, but it need not be the case 
that a given formal language can articulate this difference. 
Definition: Given a formal language l , and sets of models n1 , 
h2 ~ rn , h1 and h2 are distinguishable ( h1 I h2) ·if there is a sen-
tence "Y £ g such that "Y is true of h 1 and false of hz • Other-
wise, h1 and h2 are indistinguishable ( l11 // l12) • 
Thus, two sets of models are indistinguishable if every sen-
tence of the language either has the same set of truth values on both 
of them, or is true (or false) of one but meaningless on the other. 
In the same sense that a single model M E rn represents a configura-
tion of the universe, an arbitrary set of models h ~ rn represents a 
partially specified configuration, or a group of configurations having 
in common exactly those structures which occur in every M € h • 
Distinguishability requires that a sentence be able to express a dif-
ference between two partially specified configurations. We now state 
without proof some simple properties of distinguishability and in-
distinguishability. 
(I) If n11n2 and n' 1 ~ nl ' then n• 1n I 2 ' 
( 2) If hl //h2 and hl ~ n' 1 , then h~//h2' 
( 3) For any h 1 ¢ , h//J'n ' 
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(4) For any h, h/¢ , 
Perhaps contrary to expectations, the relation of indistin-
guishability is not an equivalence relation. It is clearly reflexive-
h// h by property ( 5)-and just as obviously symmetric. It is not, 
however, guaranteed to be transitive. That is, if n1 II hz and 
h2 // h3 , then it may be the case that h1 I h3 • To give a simple 
example, let h2 = rn.. By property (3), it is certain that h//h2 
and h2 //h3 , for any hl and h 3 . Thus if indistingnishability 
were a transitive relation, then any two sets of models (denoted here 
by l\ and h3) would be indistinguishable, which is patently false. 
We have said previously that the collection of all of the 
states of a language characterizes every configuration of the uni-
verse expressible within the language. However, these configura-
tions (and the associated states) are not independent of one another. 
We would like to establish an independent set of states such that the 
conditions postulated by a given state preclude the possibility of being 
in any other state. To this end we make the following definition. 
Definition: Let 5 be the set of all states of a language t.. A state 
h E' 6 is a mini.?nal state if there is no other state h 1 E' 15, h' 1 ¢ , 
such that h' ~ h • 
Definition: Given sets of models n1 , h2 and a set of sentences e, 
e agrees on h1, hz if for any 'YE e, and for any M1 Ehl , M 2 E h2 , 
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We now prove that given any consistent set of sentences, there 
is a minimal state on which those sentences have the same truth value. 
Theorem: Given a language l , and a set of sentences J:1.. ~ 8 , each 
of which is meaningful for some model ME rn , then there is a mini-
mal state h , such that Fl- agrees on ( M} , h • 
Proof: Let t = f.11 ~ ~ /:1 ~ g and there exists an M' E tl1 such that 
* }J * * cpM,( 'Y) 'f 0 for 'YE , and cpM( 'Y) = cpM,( i') for 'Y E 1:4} : 
(1) t -J ¢ since U Et • 
(2) Let C be a chain of elements of t under set 
inclusion. Consider Ub =Jf 1 • Clearly IJ' i;; g • /J EC 
We must show that there is an M E rn such that 
Cf>~(;') ~ ¢ for i' E /i11 • 
' 'Y-For i' E jJ , 'Y = i' i'Yz • • • i'h , there is a formula F (x) such 
that < q:>M( i' i)' • • • , cpM( i' h) > satisfies F ~(x1 , • • • , XJi) if and only if 
* cpM( ;') 1= ¢ , by a preceding corollary. 
Now, we have previously assumed that within the language of 
set theory, we have a "proper name" for each element of S in the 
range of cp , i. e. for each element { cp(-y) f i' E T } • Let 
cp( 1') , and 
a ''name'' 
i' 
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/\•••"a 6a /\a b.a 
'Yh- 2 'Yh 'Yh-1 'Yh • 
a = a if cp( -yi) = cp( 'Y j) 
'Yi 'Y· 
where a b.a is J 
,,i ,,j a ~ a 1f cp( -yi) ~ cp( 'Y j) • 
"Y. 
'Yj 1 
Thus E~(a , ••• ,a ) holdsi£andonlyif <Cf'M(')'l),···, 
1'1 'Yb 
cp M( -yh) > satisfies Frr(x1, • • • , :;,_) • Now, let e be the following 
set of formulas of extended set theory. 
Suppose there were no model which satisfies all of the sen-
tences (of the language of set theory) of e . Then by the complete-
ness theorem for set theory, there would be a finite subset of e, 
E 'YI,•••, E 'Yk with no model. But 'Y· €/Ii €C , i = 1, • • •, k and C 
' 1 
. rt II 
is simply ordered. Therefore, for some b E C , -y. E JI , i = 1, 
1 
I >,'< 
• • •, k and hence there is a model M such that 'PM1(-y) ;. ¢ for 
II ")'i 
'YEN • Therefore, E (a , a · , • • • , a )i = 1, • • • , k holds in 
'Yi! 'Yi2 'Yih. 
M ' • h 1 'Y 1 E"Yk T us with the interpretation of a as cp( -y) , these E , 
'Y 
have a model M 1 • This is a contradiction. Therefore, e has some 
rnodel, say M 11 • 
Now, e has a model M", but we cannot guarantee that the 
interpretations of the a 1 s are cp( ")') 1 s in this model. That is, we 
'Y 
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are only assured of this for the a 1s 
'Y 
occurring in E 'Yi • • • E 'Yk 
, ' 
However, we can get a permutation p of S which carries the 
interpretations of all a 1 s in M'' into q:>( -y) 's • Then let p in-
'Y 
duce an t corresponding to t 11 of M' 1 ; the resulting model 
I 
M = < S, £ > is the desired one such that, for each 'YE IJ, E'Y{a ) 
"Y 
holds in M JI and hence < cpM( "Y 1) JI • • • , cpM( 1'h) > satisfies 
* ' F~( x 1, • • • , "b_) • Therefore cpM( -y) 'I= ¢ for 'Y E" If . 
' Thus, , is an upper bound in t for the chain C , and by 
Zorn's lemma, t has a maximal element If. We now claim that 
is a minimal state of l , i. e. there is no non- empty state n' of 
l such that h' ~ h and h 1 'F h • Suppose h is not a minimal state. 
By the definition of state h is clearly a state; therefore h must 
not be minimal. Hence, there must be a 'Y ti b such that the set 
0 
is not empty. 
{ M' J cp~,('Y) = rp~('Y) for 'Y€/J U ['Y 0 }} 
Therefore, tJ U ( 'Y ) has a model, contradicting the 
0 
hypothesis that tJ is a maximal element of t • Hence, h is a 
minimal state of S., and since ~ s; liJ, ""'Pl agrees on f M J, n. 
Since the set of sentences g of a formal language may be 
countably infinite, the collection of minimal states is in general 
non-denumerably infinite. This is because any subset of g poten-
tially defines a unique state. The minimal states of a formal 
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language represent the most precisely specified configurations of 
the universe expressible within the language. However, it is not 
the case that every minimal state is necessarily distinguishable 
from every other. Consequently, the collection of minimal states 
is not the independent set of states we are seeking. In order to 
obtain an independent set of :minimal or ato:rnic states. we introduce 
the notion of a basis for a formal language. 
Definition: A set of minimal states i8 of a formal language S.. is 
a basis for l. if for any n1 , n2 € i8 , n1 I n2 and for any element 
e of s., , there is some h € tB such that hi/ e . 
Thus, the basis is a set of minimal states such that any col-
lection of models h !;;; rn is indistinguishable from at least one member 
of the basis. We now prove that it is always possible to choose a 
basis for any formal language S.. • 
Theorem: Given a formal language t , for any set of minimal states 
6 of r.. which are pairwise distinguishable, there is a basis i\ for 
S. such that 5 !;;; i8 • 
Proof: Let 9l be the set of minimal states of S.. • 9c -F ¢ by the pre-
ceding theorem. Then let 
p = [ 9 I 6 ~ 9 ~ ~, and for h', h" € q , n• /h"} • 
( 1) p 'f ¢ since 5 € p • 
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(2) Let C be a chain of elements of p under set 
inclusion, and consider I j q. = q+ . Clearly 
¥c q + ~ 9c. We must now show that for h' , h" € 9+, 
h 1 /h" • Suppose h' //h" • Now h 1 ~ ci e- C and 
h" E'q) E' C • Hence, either 9 i ~ qj or CJ j ~Qi . 
Assume qi s;;; C}j • Therefore h' , h' 1 € q.j and 
h 1 I h" • This is a contradiction. + Therefore, 9 
is an upper bound in p for C , and by Zorn's 
lemma p has a maxiinal element fa • 
We claim that ~ is a basis for S.. • We must show, that for 
any element e of : , e is indistinguishable from some h' E' ~. 
Suppose this is not the case, i. e. e is distinguishable from every 
h' € 58. Let 
Pl- = ( "Y I "Y € g ' for some h' E' 58 • h' I e by "Y } • 
By the definition of distinguishability, every sentence in U is mean-
ingful for any M € e . By the previous theorem, there is a minimal 
state h such that 14 agrees on (M} and h • Hence, h is a mini-
ma.l sta.te which is distiuguisha.ble from every h' e S8 • This is a 
contradiction, and therefore any element e is indistinguishable 
from some h' € 58. Thus, ~ is a basis for !., and 5~ ~. 
At this point it is appropriate to indicate some general prop-
erties of a basis for a formal language, and to compare them with 
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similar concepts in the literature. First of all, a formal language 
is not guaranteed to have a unique basis. Actually, this will only 
occur in certain special cases. More will be said about the impli-
cations of this fact for probability and information in a subsequent 
section. 
Corollary: A formal language l has a unique basis t} if and only 
if the set of all minimal states 9<. is pairwise distinguishable. 
Proof: "if" - By the preceding theorem l has a basis 58 :2 9t. 
Since 'k includes all minimal states '8 = 'k'. "only if" - Suppose 
there are minimal states h', h 11 such that h1 //h" • In the preced-
ing theorem let ~ = [h' J • Thus S, has a basis containing h' , but 
not h" by definition. Similarly, t.. has a basis containing h 11 but 
not h' • These are clearly distinct bases for t.. • Since this is a 
contradiction, for every h', h' ~ € 9', h' In" . 
Several other important properties of a basis for a formal 
language are directly related to the notion of meaninglessness, as 
is shown by the following theorem and its corollaries. 
Theorem: Let l be a formal language. If a set of models th ~ rn 
0 
is such that for every sentence 'YE g , 'Y is meaningful. for each 
M E" Ill , then for any basis lll of S, , ll\ 1;; U B • 
o o BE~ 
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Proof: Consider any basis 58 and some M € In • Suppose that 
0 
M i U B • Therefore, by the definition of basis, there is some 
BE~ 
minimal state h E l' such that {M }//h • Let g' be the set (pos-
sibly empty) of all sentences which are meaningless on h , i. e. 
meaningless on some M' E h. Now, since 8 11 = g - gr is a set 
of sentences each of which is meaningful on both M and n, 8" 
must clearly agree on (M} and h if hi/ (M), and since 3" con-
sists of all of the sentences which are meaningful on h, there is 
sor.ne truth assignment to the sentences of g• 1 such that g' 1 de-
fines h . But 3" agrees on (M} and h ; therefore M € h by 
the definition of a state. This is a contradiction; hence 
In I:: U B for any basis 18. 
o B €58 
Corollary: Let S.. be a formal language with a basis ~o • If for 
every sentenc-e 'Y € g, 'Y is meaningful for every M € U B , 
BEf8 
then ~ is a unique basis for S.. • 
0 
0 
Proof: In the preceding theorem, let In = u B. 
o B €~ 
Therefore, 
U B I:: U B for any basis !8, and since :ny !8 is a maximal 
BEfB BEfB 
set o: pairwise distinguishable minimal states, U B = U D • 
BE~ BE~ 
0 
Further, since the set of minimal states contained in any set of 
models is unique, ~ is a unique basis for S. • 
0 . 
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Corollary: If i is a formal language such that for every sentence 
'Y E g , 'Y is meaningful for each M € tn , then S.. has a unique basis 
!!I such that U B = In. 
B EiB 
Proof: Immediate from the theorem and the preceding corollary. 
Let us examine the condition that every sentence of a formal 
language be meaningful on each model M. One possibility is to de-
mand that no sentence contain any description such as "the present 
king of France" which is vacuous. This appears to be unreasonable 
since there will generally be plausible configurations of the universe 
in which France has no king or perhaps has more than one king. Of 
course, it is possible to define a formal language such that every 
grammatical string of the language is meaningful, but languages of 
this type will generally be quite primitive and will not provide suit-
able approximations to the natural language phenomena we wish to 
explicate. For example, even the commonly used computer languages, 
which tend to have very simple grammars and are certainly formal 
languages in our sense, generally admit grammatical but meaning-
less sentences. Thus, in 1nost versions of FORTRAN we may write 
the statement Y = X even though the variable X appears nowhere 
else in our program. The result of this is that Y will be set to 
some completely arbitrary and unknown value, thus making this 
statement meaningless. In this case, X can be considered to be a 
vacuous description since it does not denote a well-defined entity. 
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Some logicians have proposed technical solutions to the 
problem of vacuous or non-unique descriptions. Perhaps the most 
satisfactory of these have been suggested by Quine [29 ], Frege [ 14 J. 
and Carnap [ 4] • Their methods are similar in that they assign to 
any non-unique or vacuous description some particular entity in the 
niodel. This has the :result that sentences containing such descrip-
tions become meaningful, and thus all grammatical sentences have 
some associated meaning. Unfortunately, however, the specific 
meaning assigned to a sentence containing a vacuous description, 
for example, . then depends upon the properties of the entity taken 
as the denotation of such descriptions. Since the properties of this 
distinguished entity will vary from one model to another, the truth 
conditions for a sentence are not structural. That is, the procedure 
for deriving the truth value of a sentence becomes dependent on 
factual information, namely the particular attributes of the distin-
guished entity relative to the model in question. 
In our method, the truth conditions remain structural since 
we explicitly allow grammatical sentences to be semantically mean-
ingless. Indeed., as we have previously mentioned. this appears to 
be an essential characteristic of most commonly used languages. 
By referring to our definition of semantic category, we can get a 
slightly different view of this problem. If we did require that every 
sentence in our formal languages was to be meaningful on each model, 
then the semantic categories of the language would necessarily be 
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devoid of structure, since if they were not, the interpretation func-
tion cp might assign an entity of the wrong structural class to some 
referent words, at least in some models. To make the semantic 
categories this weak is tantamount to asswning that the universe of 
discourse is homogeneous with respect to the formal language, 
which contradicts the idea that there are irnplicit structural distinc-
tions among various classes of objects. 
In Carnap's approach, he further requires that a language in 
his sense be such that the atomic sentences are independent, i.e. 
that no set of atomic sentences is contradictory. In our case, how-
ever, this is much too restrictive since the non-null states of the 
language exactly.reflect the observer's view of consistent sets of 
sentences within his language. Thus, the fact that some set of sen-
tences defines the empty state implies an inconsistency relative only 
to the observer. In a different formal language, these same strings 
of words may be consistent and have a model. Thus, in one formal · 
language the two sentences, "It is freezing" and "It is not cold" may 
be consistent, while in another formal language they could be incon-
sistent by virtue of the logic of the language., as reflected in the 
semantic transformations. 
Also important with regard to the literature is the relation-
ship of our formal languages to the concepts of model theory [21, 31] . 
For example, suppose we have a formal language with referent words 
n. 
where p. 1 is an n.-ary predicate symbol. 
1 1 
Then if 
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for some model M = < S, E > of set theory, the interpretation of 
these symbols is such that 
cp(p~i) E:{ y I Vx (x E: y - :!ful :!fu2 ••• :!f uni(x = < ul ••••• uni >v } ' 
n n 
then < S, Ii) (p 1
1), • · ·, t:t>(p:) > is a model in the sense of model 
theory since it comprises sorne domain of objects or individuals 
and a set of relations on this domain. Thus, we can easily con-
struct particular formal languages which are equivalent to the 
languages of model theory-the first-order predicate calculus, 
for instance-and we can then choose an interpretation cp so that 
some model of set theory embodies the necessary characteristics 
of a model of model theory. 
Suppose that we do take the first order predicate calculus 
nl nm 
with predicate symbols p 1 , ·••,pm as a formal language. 
* Then 
if we consider 1l1 , where the interpretation function cp satisfies 
0 
the above condition for each model M ~ 1'n , the sentences of this 
0 
language will all be meaningful on every model of rn • As shown 
0 
in a previous corollary, ·this implies that h't is contained in the 
0 
union of any basis for the language. Furthermore, as in model 
theory, any distinct set of atomic sentences will define some non-
empty state, and consequently· every minimal state will be contained 
in rn • Thus, the basis will be unique and its union will be equal 
0 
to In , and the minimal stat.es are then the elementary equivalence 
0 
classes of models exactly in the sense of model theory [31, p. 55 J. 
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.Although languages of this type are not our primary concern, this 
reduction to model theory is significant in view of the many powerful 
results in this area which have contributed to our understanding of 
the foundations of mathematics. 
Having developed the idea of a basis for a formal language, 
we shall now :make use of this in defining a probability for such a 
language. In terms of classical probability theory, the event space 
will be the collection of all possible sets of observations and thus 
will include the states of any given formal language. We wish to be 
able to assign to any obs.ervation a numerical value indicating its 
probability relative to a formal language. That is, given a language 
we can determine the set of associated states, and this, together 
with the a priori probability, should be sufficient to specify the ob-
server's expectation of making some observation 0 • 
Definition: Given a formal language ~ having a basis ~ and an 
observation 0 , the >:c-probability of 0 is given by 
= 
Where P is the outer measure induced by the observer's a priori 
Probability P • 
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Note that we have used the outer measure P, rather than the 
measure P , to define the *-probability. The reason for this is that 
if the basis is composed of a non-denumerable collection of basis 
elements, we can not in general prove that the union of all basis 
elements is P-measurable. Use of the outer measure l5' simply 
ensures that the *-probability will be well-defined. For rnany lan-
guages, however, P and P will be identical on basis elements. 
Thus, if we consider the first-order predicate calculus or other 
similar languages common in model theory, where all sentences 
are meaningful on the basis, it can easily be shown that the union of 
all basis elements is P-measurable. It is also easily established that 
if U B is P-measurable, then so is U B , where 0 is any 
BE~ BEe 
B//fl'o 
observation. 
* We see immediately that P' depends directly upon the notion 
of indistinguishability. Thus, the *-probability of an observation is 
directly proportional to the measure of those basis elements from 
which it is indistinguishable. Recall that the basis can be considered 
as a collection of independent atomic states of the language, and if an 
observation can·not be distinguished from some basis element, it be-
coines identified with the configuration expressed by the sentences 
defining that basis element. The following are easily proved properties 
of the *-probability. 
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( 1) 1 " 
* )~ ( 2) p (rn0 ) s P (rn0 u rn0 > • I I 2 
(3) p):~(¢) = 0 " 
However, it is not the case that for tn0 n tn0 = ¢ , 1 2 
* * * P ( rn0 u rn0 > = P ( m0 > + P ( m0 > , I 2 1 2 
and thus, in general p* does not satisfy the traditional axioms of 
probability. Although this is at first disturbing, it is closely related 
to established results in the literature. Consider the case of languages 
based upon the lower predicate calculus. U we restrict the notion of 
state to only those sets of models which are definable by a finite num-
* her of sentences, then P is additive on those states. However, in 
the case of states defined by an infinite number of sentences, states 
that are not "finitely axiomatizable", it is known [39, chap. 12] that 
their complement is not a state •. Thus, we would not expect additivity 
in these situations. Therefore, even in the case of the lower predicate 
:i:c 
calculus, when there are more than a finite number of states, P is 
not a probability, sine e we are lacking the additivity property on the 
space of models in the sense of model theory. In general, this non-
additivity is a direct result of the fact that indistinguishability is not 
an equivalence relation. 
The possibility that JU B\ = 0 , and hence that p* is un-
_t-\B € ~ ) 
defined, has been ignored on the grounds that such a language possesses 
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a set of minimal states which in no way reflects the observer's ex-
pectations. The definition of the *-probability was given in terms of 
a single observation 0. In general, however, some set of obser-
vations n will have been made prior to observing 0 • Providing that 
the resulting set of observations, 0 U ( 0 J , is consistent, we simply 
take the conditional *-probability to deter:mine the likelihood of ob-
serving 0 given the set of observations a , where this conditional 
probability is given by 
where lno denotes n ll\ o' . 
0 1 €0 
Very generally speaking, the *-probability of some observation 
0 may be interpreted as being inversely proportional to the observer's 
estimate of the rarity of 0 • Thus, if P>',c ( tn 0 ) = 1 , the observation 
0 is a certainty in terms of the observer's previous experience and 
his assumptions concerning plausible configurations of the universe. 
On the other hand, if the >'.=-probability of 0 is very small, then 0 
represents to the observer a significant discovery relative to his cur-
rent beliefs. 
Prior to this point, we have considered an observer's formal 
language to be static in nature. However, it is very likely that as an 
observer gains experience his formal language will change in some 
Way which is dictated by this experience. That is, new alternatives 
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or states may be introduced and old ones either eliminated or made 
less probable. Thus, the processes of observation and language 
change are strongly coupled. The mechanism of this change and the 
general problem of the dynamics of language are not explicitly 
treated in this thesis since many additional concepts relating to the 
rate of acquisition of observational evidence and the temporal as-
pects of language would be necessary. Nevertheless, at any given 
time, a formal language can be used to characterize the observer's 
view of reality, and we shall later indicate that, in many instances, 
this formal language is inherently quite inflexible and resistant to 
change. 
We shall now turn to the question of information, or what in 
our sense might more appropriately be called informativeness to 
reflect its subjective nature. Suppose we have some observer and 
a formal language which expresses his current viewpoint on some 
domain of interest to him. In addition, we naturally presume that 
he has some previous experience as characterized by a set of ob-
servations O • He now makes a new observation, perhaps as the re-
sult of performing some experiment. We wish to know if this ob-
servation increases his information, and if it does, by how much in 
comparison with some other hypothetical observation. We have 
stressed that the *-probability completely specifies his expectations 
With respect to all observations. Hence, the information gained 
should be a function only of this probability, and we define it in a 
manner analogous to information theory. 
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Definition: Given a formal language S. , and an associated probability 
>'c 
P' , the information gained on observing 0 given the prior set of 
observations n is 
Before disc us sing the implications of this definition, a few 
comments are necessary. First, since we are interested only in 
information in a relative sense, we shall not specify the base of the 
logarithm. Secondly, we are assuming that the new observation 0 
is consistent with the previous experience 0 , and hence that 
tlirz n tn O 'f. ¢ • Finally, we note that by taking rn0 = rn, i.e. no 
previous experience, we obtain a measure of the "absolute" infor-
mation in 0 relative to S.. 
The information measure has the following properties: 
(I) If rn 0 ·~ rn 0 , rco11 n) ;;?: I(o21 o) , 1 2 
(2) If rn 0 nrn 0 l 2 
= mo , then 
3 
Property ( 1) says that if o1 is a more precise observation 
than Oz , then the information to be gained by observing o1 is 
greater than that gained by observing o2 • As used here, the 
terminology "more precise" means that the structural relations 
among the objects of the universe as expressed by o1 , necessarily 
entails the existence of the structure expressed by o 2 • Property (2) 
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is a condition on the additivity of the information. That is, observing 
o1 followed by o2 yields the same gain in information as the simul-
taneous observation of o1 and o2 • Taken together, these two 
properties ensure that our notion of information conforms to the in-
formation theoretic definition of the a fortiori information, or the in-
formational gain resulting from the selection of so:me particular 
alternative [36, p. 12] • 
I 
I 
Extending the analogy with information theory somewhat fur-
ther, suppose we ·have some finite set of observations 0 •••. '0 1 n 
such that lho. ntn0 . = ¢ for i, j = 1, • • ·, n and i ;. j • Thus the ob-
1 J 
servations are mutually exclusive or inconsistent. Also, assume that 
n 
ulll o. = Ill; these observations might therefore represent the n 
1=1 1 
possible outcomes of some experiment. We can then express the in-
formational gain which the observer expects will result from actually 
performing the experiment. 
Definition: Let e be an experiment with possible outcomes o1, ••·,On 
n 
such that u Ill 0. = Ill and lllo. n Ill o. = r/J for i, j = 1, •••• n and 
i=l 1 1 J 
i -/= j • Then the expected gain in information for an observer with 
formal language i and probability p* to perform the experiment 
e is 
Where 0 is the set of prior observations. 
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In order to facilitate a clearer understanding of the formal 
apparatus developed in this chapter, we shall now interpret some of 
the more important concepts diagrammatically. Note that the dia-
grams we shall present are intended as heuristic aids only and do 
not constitute an adequate method for dealing with many of the more 
co:mplex aspects of the problem. We begin by assw:ning that the space 
of models tn of the universe of discourse is arranged on our diagrams 
in such a way that the a priori probability P of any observation 0 
is proportional to the area encompassed by the set of models In 0 
associated with that observation. Figure 1 illustrates two strictly 
consistent observations o 1 and o 2 such that P(rn0 ) > P(lll 0 ) , 1 2 
i.e. o1 is more probable than o2 based on the ~bserver' s a priori 
probability. The shaded area, Tn O n fll O , represents the set of 
1 2 
models for which both observations hold, and all models contained 
within it cannot be discriminated from one another until further ob-
servational evidence is obtained. 
In a similar fashion, we can illustrate the way in which a sen-
tence of a formal language partitions the space of models. Therefore, 
suppose that some sentence "Y is true of some models. false of others. 
and meaningless on still others; the space rn might possibly be parti-
tioned as in Figure z. Again, interpreting the areas as being propor-
tional to the a priori probability, this particular sentence is most 
likely to be false, in the observer's view. This diagram shows the 
general case for a sentence 'Y , but any of these three areas could 
he null for some particular sentence. For instance, there might be 
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Figure 1. Two consistent observations. 
h\ I \ 
I I y true I y \ meaningless I y false I I I I I I I 
7 \ 
Figure z. Partitions induced by a sentence "Y • 
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no models where the sentence 'Y was false; such a sentence would be 
a tautology with respect to the language since whenever it is meaning-
ful, it is also true. Notice that we have characterized an observation 
by a closed curve and a sentence by lines bisecting the space rn • This 
is an artificial distinction for the sake of visual convenience only, 
since in either case the sets of models are defined by formulas of set 
theory. 
Now consider the superposition of Figures 1 and 2 as shown in 
Figure 3. The observer has made the two observations o1 and 0 2 , 
and we are interested in how the sentence 'Y relates to them. Suppose 
he makes observation o1 first; the sentence 'Y is ambiguous for 
this observation since there are models contained in mo for which 
1 
'Y is true and models for which "Y is false. Therefore, 1' does not 
aid in the characterization of o1 • If he now makes observation Oz , 
then, as previously pointed out, the shaded area will represent the 
only models compatible with both observations. The diagram shows 
that 'Y is false of all of these models, and thus "Y can be used to 
express what has been observed. Notice that "Y is not ideal for this 
purpose since there are many models for which ~ is false that are 
not contained in ?n O n lT°b • That is, the observer's observational 
1 2 
experience is more refined or precise than the sentence 1' can 
express. 
Suppose, on the other hand, that Oz was the first observation; 
the sentence "Y is clearly not true of o2 , but neither is it false, 
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rn 
Y true / 
\ mean~gless 
y false 
Figure 3. Relationship of the sentence 'Y to the observations 
o1 and o2 • (Superposition of Figures I and 2) 
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since Oz admits models for which -y is meaningless. The models 
contained within tn0 are equivalent to one another on the basis of z 
the current observational evidence, and therefore i' is not useful 
in describing Oz since the observer can only assert the truth or 
falsity of a sentence. Referring to our definitions of elements and 
states of a formal language, we conclude that the set of models for 
which -y is true is a state, as is the set of models for which -y is 
false, but the set of models where i' is meaningless is not, al-
I 
I 
though it is an element. 
In order to clarify the notion of a basis somewhat more, con-
sider the following simple example; assume that we have a language 
whose only two sentences, -y1 and 'Yz , are: 
-y1 "Spiders are responsive to light" , 
'Yz "Spiders eat ants" • 
These sentences are supposed to have been generated by some syntax 
and their meanings to be expressed by an associated semantics. 
Figure 4 illustrates how these two sentences might partition the model 
space. To see how each of the sentences could be either true, false, 
or meaningless, independent of the other, consider the word "spiders". 
This word will be assigned some part of speech and thereby be associ-
ated with a semantic category, perhaps the class of animate objects. 
The formula defining this semantic category will express the generic 
structural properties which are required of animate objects. However, 
it may be that in some possible configurations of the universe, the 
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F 
Figure 4. State diagram for a simple language having 
two sentences. 
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class of entities denoted by the word "spiders" fails to satisfy these 
requirements, i.e. the interpretation cp of "spiders" does not be-
long to the appropriate semantic category. For instance, in a given 
model, the class of "spiders" might include a spider which had just 
been stepped on and killed. Does this entity still satisfy the struc-
tural requirements of 11 spiderness"? It might, if for example these 
requirements involved only the molecular composition of the object 
in question, or it might not, in which case any sentences speaking 
about spiders would be meaningless for this model. An analogous 
situation holds for the other referent words in these two sentences, 
and thus, in general, the implicit structure required of the objects 
in the domain of the language may be violated in some plausible con-
figurations of the universe. If this is not the case, i. e. if the sen-
tences are meaningful, there are certainly valid interpretations of 
the words in both sentences which render them either true or false. 
As we have previously mentioned, the deep structural aspects of a 
language, which are in part embodied by the semantic categories, 
are essential to the constructive generation and analysis of strings 
of words into understandable sentences. On the other hand, the very 
irnposition of this structure dictates that these sentences are not 
universally applic:able to every c:onc:eivable reality. 
Since the two sentences of our example language are inde-
pendent in the manner discussed above, Figure 4 shows a non-empty 
elernent corresponding to each of the nine possible truth assign-
ments, and the symbols indicate the particular truth assignments 
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defining the elements. For instance, the element T¢ is the set of 
models where ,,1 is true and "Yz is meaningless. The states of 
this language are defined by the following sentence/truth value 
combinations: T-, F-, -T, -F, TT, TF, FT, FF, where a 
"-" indicates that the corresponding sentence is not used to define 
the state involved. In addition to the states defined by these sets 
of sentences, 1n and the empty set of models are also states. The 
minimal states are those defined by TT, TF, FT, and FF, and 
any one of these is distinguishable from each of the others. As we 
have shown, in this case the basis is unique and comprises the 
entire collection of minimal states. 
As a final example, we illustrate a situation where the basis 
is not unique. Figure 5 shows the state diagram for a hypothetical 
language having three sentences ,,1 , 'Yz, and ,,3 • Each element 
of the language is characterized by an assignment of truth values to 
'Yi, 'Yz, and ,,3 ; these values are specified by the sequences of 
three symbols shown on the diagram, which will be considered to 
name the corresponding elements. There are seven minimal states 
which are defined by the following sets of truth values: 
TTT, TFT, FTT, FFT, FFF, -TF, T-F, 
where "-" indicates that the correponding sentence is unnecessary 
to define that state. Notice that the two minimal states T¢F and 
¢TF are indistinguishable, i.e. there is no sentence which is true 
of one and false of the other. As a consequence of this, there are 
two distinct bases for this language, namely, 
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Yz T / Y3 
T F ~ 
T4JT F 
T TTT I TFT I / / Tt/>F 
t-FFT /~;--
"' Y1 F FTT I ~FF I ~'~ ~-~-
'TT/ 'FF/ I q,q,q, /,TF I /,F, 
Figure S. State diagram for a simple language having a 
non-unique basis. 
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l\l = f TTT, TFT I FTT, FFT I FFF I ¢TF} 
and 
ij2 = fTTT' TFT I FTT, FFT I FFF I T¢F}. 
Also significant is the fact that the logic of this simple language pre-
cludes the existence of certain states. For instance, the state de-
fined by TFF is empty, indicating that this is an inconsistent assign-
ment of truth values relative to the semantics of the language. If the 
meanings of these three sentences were completely independent of one 
another, then there would be 3 3 = 27 non-empty elements., nine 
minimal states, and the basis would be unique, However, we empha-
size again that an essential characteristic of nearly all formal lan-
guages is that they embody some non-trivial logic, and the sentences 
of these languages are consequently not independent. 
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V. EXPERIMENTAL OBSERVATIONS AND SCIENTIFIC THEORY 
In this chapter, we shall utilize our formal definitions of prob-
ability, information, and language to interpret some of the problems 
confronting a scientific researcher. Therefore, suppose that we are 
considering a scientist who is about to perform some experiment. Let 
us imagine that this man is an experimental biologist who is attempting 
to study the processing of visual information in certain classes of in-
sects. Specifically, we will assume that he is interested primarily in 
examining the behavior of certain types of neurons and their functional 
relationship to external visual stimuli. In order to accomplish this, of 
course, he must have available a certain amount of experimental equip-
ment, and he chooses some appropriate portion of this equipment to 
aid him in any particular experiment. This apparatus constitutes the 
experimental environment and is instrumental in determining exactly 
what quantities will be measurable in the experiment. Thus, for ex-
ample, he may be planning to insert tiny microelectrodes into one of 
the insect's optic lobes and then to record the electrical signals from 
nearby nerve cells. It could be that he is then interested in examining 
the detailed electrical waveform of a spike discharge from these cells, 
but we shall suppose that he is most concerned with the temporal be-
havior of the neurons in encoding the visual signals. Thus he will not 
find the analog wave shapes as relevant as the times of discharge of 
spikes from a cell, and consequently he views the neuron's output as a 
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train of essentially zero width pulses and concentrates his attention 
on the intervals between these pulses. Of course, in order to deter-
mine exactly when a pulse occurs, i.e. when a cell discharges, he 
must adopt some criterion, such as the time when the voltage meas-
ured at the electrode exceeds some threshold. He might then record 
the neural signals, after they have been amplified and filtered suitably, 
on a device like a strip chart recorde~, but since the firing times of 
the cells are the fundamental items of interest he can simply digitize 
these times and collect these data using a small computer system. 
We will suppose that he takes this latter course, thereby enabling him 
to collect a large amount of data and save it for subsequent analysis. 
Of course, he could also perform some analysis in "real time" as the 
experiment proceeds but this is not germain to our example. 
Now, with regard to the actual experiment he is going to per-
form, he will perhaps insert two of these microelectrodes into certain 
general areas of interest within the insect's visual. nervous system. 
He then plans to display to the insect, which is fixed in the center of 
a large globe, some pattern consisting of alternating dark and light 
stripes. This pattern will be turned on and off, and he will thus be 
able to examine both the transient and steady- state responses of the 
neurons near his probes and also the interrelationships among the 
two neurons. The computer system will record the firing times of 
the cells together with timing signals pertinent to the stimulus. Each 
Phase of the experiment will be repeated a number of times to ensure 
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a statistically sufficient sample. Subsequent to this he will analyze 
the data using various computer algorithms which he has previously 
found useful. As might be surmised, this experimental description 
is not hypothetical; for a more detailed discussion see Mc Cann and 
Dill [24 J • 
The purpose of the preceding discussion has been to establish 
a specific framework within which we may discuss various instances 
of more general phenomena. One of the questions of interest here 
concerns the possible outcomes of such an experiment. As we have 
indicated, the space of possible outcomes has been at least partially 
determined by the selection of the apparatus and the design of the 
overall experimental environment. 
In terms of the diagrams introduced previously, an experiment 
may be characterized by a disjoint covering of the space rn , where 
the members of the cover are sets of models associated with observ-
able experimental outcomes. That is, the cover comprises a set of 
observations having the property that some one of them holds for any 
model M Eth. 
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The diagram illustrates the case of an experiment that has six 
possible observable outcomes. That is to say, the models contained 
in a given 0. are all those possible configurations of the world in 
1 
which this experiment would be observed to have the same outcome. 
Suppose for a moment that M 1 were the actual configuration of the 
world,, the "true" model. Then one could conclude as a result of this 
experiment that the "true" state was in o1 , and that we were not, 
for example, in the configuration M3 • However, it would remain 
an open question whether we were at M 1 or M2 • 
If virtually any conceivable experiment could be performed, 
then every such disjoint cover would be representative of some pos-
sible experiment. What we are saying is that the experimental appa-
ratus, once chosen, determines some sub-collection of the collection 
of all possible disjoint covers. Among the covers that are excluded 
will be those which have as members some observation involving a 
quantity which the equipment is incapable of measuring. Those which 
remain are indicative of the experimenter's freedom of choice with 
regard to the experimental parameters under his control. In our 
example. if the amplitude of the spikes gradually decreased with time, 
then because the data recorded make no direct allowance for this, it 
can not be an observable outcome of an experiment using this equip-
inent. Consequently, the raw data collected already represent an 
abstraction from what is potentially available. In addition, it could 
be that other unmeasured quantities, such as the ambient air temper-
ature, have some non-trivial effect, but again, correlations of this 
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type are not possible observational outcomes. The selection of the 
stimulus itself clearly also limits what can be directly observed. 
Thus, we certainly can not observe what the response of the neurons 
in question is to the appearance of another insect, say, by using a 
pattern of stripes. Notice that we are speaking now about what is 
observable in this experiment. that is. what can be perceived. This 
is to be interpreted exactly in the sense that we have formally defined 
an observation. Consequently, the possible outcomes are independent 
of the observer's language and relate only to the configurations of the 
universe which might conceivably obtain. As yet we have said nothing 
about the conclusions he might draw from some given outcome, since 
this will be determined by his language. 
The main point of the preceding is that the observable results 
of a scientific experiment are dictated in large measure by the specific 
details of the experimental set-up. Various outcomes are thus ex-
cluded a priori, and others become not only possible but highly prob-
able. In many ways this point is obvious and we are certainly not say-
ing that there is any practical method for greatly expanding the space 
of possible outcomes. For example, if a microelectrode could be 
placed adjacent to every neuron in the insect's visual system, the set 
of potential observables would be immense. But since there may be a 
million such nerve cells, this is clearly a technical impossibility, 
without even considering whether the data collected could be sensibly 
analyzed. Also, it would be naive to assume that the outcomes which 
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are possible for a given experiment are arbitrary, since they are 
largely the result of the scientist's evaluation of what are meaning-
ful or relevant quantities to measure. This evaluation then results 
in a determination of the actual experimental conditions, within 
practical limitations. However, these choices, once made, do 
strictly limit the scope or range of alternative outcomes. 
Now, returning to our example, we can visualize that such an 
experiment has a very large number of possible results. That is, the 
set of all observations which the experimenter could conceivably make 
as a result of performing this type of experiment, even though re-
stricted by the experimental conditions, still encompasses a virtually 
unlimited number of actual possibilities. These include many uninter-
esting cases where, for example, the equipment breaks down or the 
insect dies before the data can be gathered. Furthermore, the total 
collection is not a mutually exclusive set of observations. Thus, one 
possibility would be that the cells respond to the stimulus, whereas 
two other possibilities would be that they respond to the stimulus by 
increasing or decreasing their average rate of spike discharge. 
These are clearly not independent events; on the other hand the experi-
menter would presumably not observe the more general of these if his 
apparatus permitted the observation of one of the latter two. There-
fore, we can assume that there is some maximal set of observations 
which are all mutually exclusive, where the elements of this set are 
determined by the quantities he is measuring, the precision of the 
experimental apparatus, and the means available for examining the 
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results. Each possibility in this set thus represents a distinct 
experimental outcome, and the set itself defines a disjoint cover of 
the model space, as previously mentioned. 
If we consider any such specific instance of a scientific 
experiment, then it seems intuitively clear that there are only a 
finite number of observable possible outcomes. That is. we have 
no reason to believe that the cover associated with the experiment 
has more than a finite number of cover sets. Furthermore, since 
there will always be an infinite number of relationships which are 
not specified by the experiment, in general every cover set will 
contain an infinite number of models among which the experiment 
does not distinguish. 
Recalling our definition of observation, the set of observations 
which constitute a cover is inconsistent, and in addition, the union 
over the set of possible configurations of the universe of discourse 
associated with these observations includes all admissible configur-
ations or models. Thus, it is certain that one and only one of these 
possibilities will be realized by performing the experiment. We 
emphasize again that the outcomes of the experiment correspond to 
observations and are not directly related to the observer's theories 
as expressed by his language. Of course, the various outcomes of 
the experiment are not equally likely, the probability of any one being 
given by the observer's a priori probability P which reflects his 
metaphysical assumptions about the domain he is studying. 
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We now turn to the question of how the experimenter discrim-
inates these experimental outcomes. We have already said that 
certain outcomes are somehow more relevant than others. How is 
this matter of the relevance or importance of the result of the experi-
ment to be explicated? Our first inclination is to say that this depends 
upon his current theory about the do:rnain he is studying. That is, he 
would certainly like the actual outcome to be consistent with what he 
now believes. Furthermore, he hopes that the result will do more than 
simply confirm what he already knows. Ideally the new observation 
should further reduce the set of models satisfying his total observational 
experience and thereby contribute to refining his theory. In order to 
say what we mean by a theory in this sense, we utilize the notion of 
states of a formal language and the sets of sentences that define them. 
Prior to performing the experiment we have outlined, our experimenter 
has some body of data previously gathered about the domain, in this 
case data relevant to the insect visual system. These data comprise 
some set of observations which we presume to be consistent, and 
associated with these observations is some set of models satisfying 
all of them. Now~ consider the smallest state of his formal language 
containing this set of models; the sentences defining this state are 
an either true or false of every observation he has previously made. 
These sentences act therefore as axioms for his theory. They might 
include such statements as, "The insects studied have some neurons 
which increase their rate of spike discharge for approximately two 
seconds after a 20° spot of light is turned on in their field of view", 
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or "The insects studied do not respond in any way to polarized light". 
In general, these axioms are subject to change since they are based 
only on what he has observed, and it is possible that some subsequent 
observation may contradict them. 
Figure 6 shows a partial state diagram for the experimenter1 s 
formal language. The set of models denoted by Q represents all 
those configurations of the universe which are consistent with his 
previous observational experience. The state h is asswned to be 
the smallest state containing a , and thus the sentences of the lan-
guage that define h are axioms of the experimenter's current theory. 
Notice that the axioms do not precisely delimit '2 ; there arc models 
ME h which are not members of O • This simply means that the for-
mal language he employs is not capable of expressing every detail of 
his previous experience and provides only some convenient approxi-
mation to it. 
This should not, however, be viewed as necessarily negative. 
The lack of refinement results from ignoring aspects specific to the 
time of day, individual subject used, etc., which are of no relevance 
to the researcher. These he appropriately ignores if they indeed are 
irrelevant, a chance he must always in some way take. 
In addition to the axioms, which are either wholly true or 
false of his observations, there will be other statements which repre-
sent speculations or hypotheses. Very often these will be generaliz-
ations of his previous experience: for instance, "all insects have 
- 100 -
State h 
Figure 6. Partial state diagram showing experimental axioms 
and their relationship to prior observations. 
0 Hypotheses 
State h 
Figure 7. Expanded view of state h (from Figure 6) showing 
experimental hypotheses and a new· observation 0. 
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neurons which increase their rate of spike discharge in proportion 
to the ambient light level". Since he has clearly not tested this for 
every insect, this statement will be neither true nor false of all his 
observations. There may also be other hypotheses which are com-
pletely untested, in the sense that no previous observational evidence 
is related to them. These he presmnably intenda to either confirm or 
deny by subsequent experiments. The salient point here is that the 
conditional or hypothetical statements in his formal language act to 
partition the state defined by the axioms into a number of smaller 
states contained in it. Each of these states represents a refinement 
of his theory for which insufficient evidence currently exists. More-
over, the statements characterizing these states will most likely be 
experimentally verifiable, although to do so may involve procedures 
which are very complex or not technically feasible with his present 
equipment. In any case, these hypotheses act as a guide to further 
experimentation, since to perform an experiment whose possible 
outcomes can not be discriminated by some statement of his language 
would not be meaningful. Therefore, the experimental outcomes which 
are relevant to him are mirrored directly in the statements of his lan-
guage. 
An Wustration of the effect of hypotheses on the partitioning of 
the model space is shown in Figure 7. The state h and the set of 
models O are the same as in Figure 6; the two dashed lines corres-
pond to sentences of the formal language whose truth or falsity is not 
determined by the observations previously made. Now suppose that 
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the experimenter can perform some experiment which has the 
observation 0 as a possible outcome. If he actually does this and 
observes 0 as the result of the experiment, then 0 1 will char-
acterize the set of models consistent with his total experience. 
Also, the two hypotheses will have been resolved, since they are 
now either confirmed or denied on the basis of the new evidence 0 • 
Consequently, observing 0 is informative relative to the experi-
. 
menter' s theory as expressed within his formal language. 
Notice that if he has no hypotheses to be tested, that is, if 
every statement of his language is either completely true or false of 
all his observations, then he will do no further experiments. His 
theory is complete because he can visualize no sensible means of 
refining it. Needless to say, very few modern scientific theories 
have achieved such a status. 
Now, with regard to the selection of a specific experiment 
to be performed, several remarks can be made in light of the pre-
ceding discussion. The choice of experiment will be based upon how 
informing the experimenter anticipates the outcome will be. Since 
he knows. in principle, exactly what the potential outcomes are. and 
since he also has various hypotheses which he wishes to confirm, 
the combination of these will dictate that certain experiments are more 
useful to him than others. This brings us back to our definition in the 
preceding chapter of the expected informational gain for an experiment. 
If there are several experiments which may be performed with equal 
ease, then the proper choice from the experimenter's standpoint is 
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the one which has the highest expected informational payoff. In a 
manner analogous to information theory, this experiment is ideally 
one where the *-probabilities of the various outcomes are all equal, 
and since this probability is a function of the observer's language, 
the hypotheses he wishes to investigate are implicitly taken into 
account. Consequently, the inforznational gain referred to here is 
again in the subjective sense of informativeness and the experimenter 
therefore attempts to choose an experiment whose possible outcomes 
coincide well with the alternatives opened by certain of his uncon-
firmed hypotheses. 
To illustrate this point, consider the following example which 
is represented graphically in Figure 8. Suppose that an experimenter 
has some body of experimental data; '2 is the set of models char-
acterized by the corresponding observations. Further, assume for 
the sake of simplicity that the sentences of his formal language all 
result in a horizontal cut across the space of models. That is, using 
the experimental apparatus he has available together with all of the 
theory he feels is in any way applicable to the domain he is consider-
ing. the expressible concepts within his formal language divide up the 
possible worlds into collections of models like the rectangle delimited 
by a and ~ • Thus, in the diagram, a and ~ correspond to pre-
viously verified statements, and 1' represents an untested hypothesis 
relative to '2 • Now imagine that he could perform one of two possible 
experiments, say, el or e2 . el and ez each have two outcomes 
which are delimited by the solid lines E 1 and E 2 , respectively. 
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-------------- a 
Figure 8. Hypothetical case showing three sentence partitions, 
a, 13, and "Y, belonging to some formal language, and 
two experimental partitions, E 1 and E 2 • 0 is the 
set of rnodels representing prior observational 
experience. 
/ 
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Which of these two experiments will he actually choose to perform? 
If he performs experiment el and thus determines whether the models 
below the line E 1 or the models above the line E 1 are consistent 
with what he observes, then he may be able to confirm or deny the 
hypothesis 'Y, depending on which of the results he obtains. On the 
other hand, if he performs experiment ez • neither of its outcomes 
will confirm or deny "Y or any other hypothesis of his language since 
they would also partition the model space horizontally. 
Assume, as we have previously, that the observer's a priori 
probability is proportional to area on the diagram. Now, if experi-
ment e1 turns out successfully, the statements "Y and f3 will then 
characterize, as well as possible, the resulting set of models O' , 
but no matter what the outcome of e2 is, the best state description 
of the resulting set of models will still be given by the statements a 
and J3 • Consequehtly, the observer will gain no information by per-
forming e2 but can reasonably expect to be better informed by per-
forming e1 • Notice, however, that if his language could express 
some statement which, for instance, coincided with the boWldary E 2 , 
then if ez. was completely successful. he could characterize the 
resulting set of models O" by using a, 13, and the statement coin-
ciding with E 2 • This state is clearly much smaller than the state 
defined by "Y and J3 which is the most he can achieve by performing 
e1 . Consequently, if his language embodied the concepts necessary 
to appropriately express the outcomes of ez ' this experiment would 
be seen to have a greater potential informational payoff than e1 • But 
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his inability to grasp these concepts prevents him from conceiving of 
e2 as a reasonable experiment, and his choice is necessarily e1 . 
This explicates in a precise way the channeling effect of observations 
and theory on further experimentation, and thus on the development of 
new theory. These notions are related to those of "normal science" 
by Kuhn [22] and to the Whorfian hypothesis [44. p. 213] . 
The counter-argument-namely that the scientist is not con-
fined by his language/theory-depends on either the existence of a 
universal language or, what is tantamount to the same thing from the 
point of view of this paper, his ability to move cognitively with no 
conceptual boundaries. The fact that a universal language can not 
exist will be discussed subsequently. The dynamics of language 
change are beyond the scope of this thesis. However, we can not 
help but feel there are inertias involved which essentially substantiate 
the above analysis. 
The relationship between the language structures and the pos-
sible experimental outcomes has another dimension which stems from 
rather different considerations. We have previously mentioned that the 
available experimental apparatus determines certain bounds on the set 
of experimental results, for example, by limiting the degree of pre-
cision of certain measurements. In other instances, the equipment 
may actually preclude observations of some physical quantities. Thus 
in our example experiment, the microelectrodes used may only be 
suitable for measuring potential changes external to a neuron but can 
not be employed to make similar measurements within such cells. 
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Therefore, practical limitations on the amount of available equipment 
and matters of technical feasibility may impose rather arbitrary 
restrictions on the potential experimental outcomes. Another way 
of looking at this is to say that the apparatus acts to determine the 
experimenter's "contact points" with the reality of his experiment. 
If we visualize the systeni he is studying as a network of "black 
boxes" connected in some fashion, then these "contact points" are 
identified with the inputs and outputs to the "black boxes", i.e. the 
set of measurable quantities. 
Now, recognizing that the experimental apparatus plays an 
important role in determining the character of the observable experi-
mental outcomes, we ask how this affects the observer's language. 
Since the information gained by the experimenter when he performs 
some experiment is directly related to his ability to distinguish the 
outcomes of that experiment in his language, it follows that the 
hypotheses embedded within the language are indirectly linked to the 
experimental apparatus. Thus, the experimental environment in-
fluences the obse.rvable outcomes and they in turn impose conditions 
upon the language, if it is to be an informative language for that 
experimental domain. This relationship is particularly important 
because the adaptability of the experimental environment is typically 
not great. Modern scientific practice indicates that the trend is to 
more and more sophisticated and complex experimental equipment 
and in many cases, once this equipment is adequately developed, it 
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is used for long periods of time. The result of this is that the language 
of the experimenters also tends to stabilize for equally long periods, 
and consequently the language acquires a somewhat unnatural rigidity 
or resistance to change. Thus, although the formal language of an 
experimentalist may not be inherently fixed in nature, it is apt to be-
come so by virtue of its necessary relationship to empirically observ-
able phenomena. 
The preceding sections of this chapter have dealt with the gen-
eral relationships among formal languages, observations, and scientific 
experiments. We shall now consider, in greater detail than we have 
previously, the formulation and interpretation of scientific theories. 
Following this, we shall return to the specific examples presented in 
the introduction and investigate them in the light of these discussions. 
In order to get at the notion of a scientific theory, let us ask what we 
can say about the meaning of a sentence of a formal language. We 
know that to each such sentence there corresponds some formula of 
the language of set theory, having certain free variables. Precisely 
what doe.s such a formula express? We have said that it character-
izes a rel~tionship among the objects which are taken as the values 
of its free variables. 
Now imagine some specific sentence of a formal language and 
a particular model or configuration of the universe. Note that one can 
not determine whether the sentence is true of that configuration without 
knowing the interpretation of the referent words. Thus the meaning of 
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the sentence involves the denotation of the referent words in addition 
to their structural properties, as specified by the semantic categories, 
and the interrelationships required to exist among them, as specified 
by the structure of the sentence itself. 
At this point in our discussion we can not say what the refer-
ent words denote. only that once this is known we can describe the 
relationships existing among those things. Can this be strengthened? 
Is it possible that we can say within a formal language all that we mean 
or, on the other hand, is it necessary that there be some implicit or 
tacit knowledge? 
What do we Dlean by tacit knowledge? We assw:ne that a person 
speaking a given language understands the syntax of that language and 
the structural aspects of its semantics. Suppose, for example, that a 
person who speaks English hears the sentence "Bob is in Pettalle". 
One expects him to know that this is indeed a sentence and that it ex-
presses the fact that someone is located in a certain place; we would 
not expect him to respond "I am not sure that what you said was a sen-
tence, or the nature of the relationship it presumably expressed". He 
could sensibly respond "Who is Bob and where is Pettalle ?" The 
meanings of Bob and Petta.lle, unless otherwise defined, must be tacitly 
known. Scientific theories that require no tacit knowledge, i. e. those 
in which all concepts are completely structural, are precisely the 
theories of pure mathematics. An empirical theory, however, is a 
theory where such tacit knowledge is necessary. This is an obvious 
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statement that simply calls attention to the fact that any empirical 
theory has certain basic terms which can not be further reduced by 
definition. Observe that there is no need to debate whether tacit 
knowledge is required only in connection with the meanings of words. 
It can easily be seen that by adding new words to a language and 
giving them tacit meanings, one can reduce all tacit knowledge to 
implicit understanding of the meanings of individual words. 
As the next step, we inquire into the legitimate meaning of 
the notion of scientific theory. Such a theory clearly concerns some 
set of sentences of a formal language. These sentences, say e, 
are the axioms and hypotheses of the theory, together with their 
logical consequences. Furthermore, a scientific theory certainly 
purports to say what configurations of the universe actually obtain, 
i. e. something about the world around us. In view of the above dis-
cussion, however, we can not conclude that the meaning of the theory 
is the set of all possible models for which the sentences of e are 
true, simply because the truth or falsity of a sentence of a formal 
language depends also on the interpretations of the referent words 
which for an empirical theory must be essentially tacit. Thus, as a 
first hypothesis, a scientific theory is a set of sentences and an inter-
pretation of the referent words of those sentences; and the meaning of 
the theory is the set of all models for which those sentences, under 
the given interpretation, are all true. 
Of course it is essential to associate the notion of a scientific 
theory with observations, which we now do. Whereas a scientific 
- 111 -
theory depends upon an bnplicit understanding of the meanings of its 
words, that tacit knowledge should be tied to empirical observations. 
Suppose someone asks "What do you mean by ~ ? " where a i~ a 
.basic, tacitly understood word of our theory. We can not tell him. 
But we certainly should be able to show him, perhaps by pointing or 
suggesting to hhn that he perforrn certain experiments or examine 
certain objects. Thus the tacit meanings should not be mysterious 
but should arise directly from observational experience. This is 
indeed the function of student laboratories in a scientific education. 
One can translate this, through the definitions and theorems given 
previously, into the requirements that the set of models prescribing 
the meaning of a scientific theory should be definable in terms of ob-
servations in our sense. How are we to do this? Consider two pos-
sibilities: 
( 1) The set of models that constitute the meaning of 
the scientific theory must be associated with an 
observation, or a finite number of observations. 
( Z) Given a set of models h which is the meaning of 
a scientific theory, then for any rnodel M;. h 
there is some observation which holds for M but 
for no model in h • Loosely speaking, if the theory 
does not hold for some possible world, one can 
ascertain this fact by an appropriately designed 
experiment. For a similar view, see Popper [27, 
sec. 6] • 
Condition ( 1) is clearly too strong; a useful scientific theory 
obviously says more than that some finite set of objects are in a certain 
fixed relationship. When we say the condition is too strong, we do not 
mean to exclude scientific theories that satisfy it, but we note that the 
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assumption of the condition for all theories seems to imply acceptance 
of a totally finite universe, finite in every way, including a finite nwn-
her of discrete time quanta. Consider the simplistic theory consisting 
of the single sentence "Flies respond to visual stimuli". It seems un-
warranted to assume there will be only a finite number of instants 
and/ or stimuli where this could be either true or false. The second 
condition, ( 2), is tantamount to the as swnption that the meaning of a 
scientific theory is given by the intersection of the sets of models 
associated with an infinite number of observations. To see this, let 
h ,b._the set of models which constitute the meaning of the theory. For 
any model M;. h , let OM be an observation which is valid for every 
M' € h, but not for M • This corresponds to the negation of the obser-
vation stipulated in ( 2). h is obviously the intersection of all such 
OM' s. Thus, this weaker condition seems more plausible, and we 
tentatively accept ( 2) as the relationship between a scientific theory 
and observations. 
The following definition specifies the conditions which must 
hold if a language is to be able to precisely delimit some observation: 
Definition: An observation 0 is describable in a formal language l 
if rn0 = h , where h is a state of the language. If eh is a set of 
sentences of ! defining h ' then e is said to describe 0 • 
n 
Every possible observation 0 is describable in some formal 
language, and this can be accomplished by a single sentence. The 
argument to this end is trivial: 
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Lemma: For any observation 0 , there is a formal language t in 
which 0 is describable by a single sentence. 
Proof: Let 0 = < F(x1, • • •, x ) , a 1, ·••,a > where a. c S. Then n n 1 
let .t be a formal language with the sentence -,, = -,,1-,,2 ••• 'l'n such 
that cp( -,,i) = ai • The lexicon L contains the rules f3i -Yi for 
i = 1, • • •, n • Cf3. = S • The grammar G contains the rule 
1 
R:a ...... 13 1 (32 • • • ~n and the associated semantic transformation is 
Therefore, the formula of set theory associated with the sentence 
-,, is 
Hence, -,, is true of some model M € tl\ if and only if ME: f1b . 
Therefore -"Y describes 0 • 
Now, a finite set of sentences together with an interpretation of 
their referent words always characterizes a set of models which could 
be considered as the meaning of some scientific theory. In fact, the 
following lemma shows that these sentences describe some single ob-
servation. 
Lemma: Any finite set of sentences e of a formal language l , to-
gE!ther with some truth assignment to the sentences, describes some 
observation 0 • 
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Proof: suppose e consists of the sentences 'YI, 'Yz' · · · , 'Yn . Let 
y. = I if 'Y· is assigned the value true, y. = 0 if 'Y· is to be fahe, 
1 1 1 1 
and let F 'Yi( x., y .) be the formula of set theory corresponding to 'Y· . 
1 1 l 
"Y1 - 'Yz - " 'Yn -Then let F(x1, · • •, xm) = F (x1, y 1) AF (x2, Yz) A··· F (xn, yn) , 
where x • · •, x are the accumulated free variables that stand for I' m 
~(o 1 ), • • ·, cp(om) • 61' ···,om are all the distinct referent words 
appearing in the -y' s, and y. takes the value 1 or 0 as specified 
1 
by the truth assignment. Then 0 = < F(x1, • • ·, xm)' cp(o 1), cp(o), • • ·, 
cp (om) > is an observation described by e under the given truth as sign-
ment. 
Note that this lemma does not imply that the models charac-
terized by e represent the actual outcome of some experiment, only 
that the observation 0 is possible in principle. As we have previously 
discussed, there is one model M0 which is the true model-the con-
figuration which actually holds. To verify a scientific theory is to make 
the observations defining the set of models associated with it and to as-
certain that this set of models contains M0 • Obviously verification in 
this manner is limited by experimental apparatus and technological 
possibilities. Thus, for example, given that we tacitly know the mean-
ings of 11life 11 and "Mars", it is a scientific theory that there is life on 
Mars. This particular theory is as yet unverifiable. 
We have shown that a finite set of sentences describes some 
observation; what about an infinite set of sentences? The following 
theorem demonstrates that if the infinite set of sentences is recursive, 
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then there is some formal language where a finite set of sentences 
will characterize exactly the same configurations of the universe, 
and therefore the infinite set describes some observation. By a 
recursive set of sentences, we mean that for some Godel numbering 
of the referent words of a language, then the resulting Godel numbers 
for the sentences of the language for:m a recursive set of integers. 
Theorem: Let S.. be a formal language. If e is a recursive set of 
sentences of t , then there is some formal language t' such that, 
for a finite set of sentences e • belonging to :.• , the set of models 
defined by e relative to ! coincides with the set of models defined 
by e' relative to t'. Hence e and e' both define some observ-
ation 0. 
Proof: t is a formal language. Both the syntax and the semantics of 
t are formalized within set theory. Thus it is easy to see that a 
meta-language for S.. could also be formalized within set theory, in-
cluding a definition of the notion "true in language S.. ". Call this 
formal language S}. (Of course, in general, we can not define "true 
in language !.1 ", within ~· itself (39. chap .. 8 ]. ) 
Since the set of sentences e is recursive, we can give a re-
cursive definition of e within S} in a finite way. Then one can 
express within S..', using this definition, that the sentences of e are 
true, and to do this requires only a finite number of sentences of the 
meta-language S..' • As previously shown, this finite set of statements 
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describes some possible observation 0 , and thus e also describes 
0 , relative to £ . To carry out this argument in all its detail would 
require a great deal of space and time. 
This theorem and the preceding lemma raise the possibility 
that our definition ( 1) of the meaning of a scientific theory may be 
adequate. Do we indeed know of any set of sentences which do not 
describe s·ome observation? The answer is definitely yes; the Godel 
incompleteness theorem tells us that the integers (in this case a 
theory in which no tacit knowledge is necessary since it is purely 
mathematical) can not be described in any formal language by a 
finite or recursive set of sentences. More precisely, given an 
object b , the set of models where b is the integers can not be 
characterized by a recursive set of sentences. Thus, the meaning 
of the theory of the integers does not correspond to any finite set of 
observations. This extremely strong form of the Godel result is 
discussed in Kleene [ZO, sec. 60 J • 
Although for most practical scientific theories~ it is not 
possible to definitely establish that definition (I) in fact does not 
hold, it is our feeling that this is often the case. For example, con-
sider a theory which purports to be about living organisms; it is 
highly unlikely that a definition of the notion of living in terms of 
a finite number of observationally specifiable objects can establish 
precisely what we mean by this concept. Concepts like "living", 
"cell", "metabolic process", etc., are learned not through language 
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but become tacitly understood through years of experience and long 
hours of directed laboratory familiarization. One everyday concept 
which we all take for granted is that of volume. It has been shown 
that it can not be prescribed in a finite number of observations. In-
deed, a much stronger result holds. However, this matter will be 
taken up frorn a sornewhat different point of view. 
Let us turn to the related problem of reductionism. In 
chapter I, we identified two forms of this problem, the first of 
which will be discussed here. The second aspect of the reduction-
ist philosophy, namely the reduction of one theory to another more 
basic one, will be treated subsequently. The immediate question 
is whether the truth or falsity of a theory can always be reduced to 
the outcome of some experiment. More precisely, is it legitimate 
to restrict the notion "valid theory" to those theories for which the 
possibility of verification or denial on the basis of experimental 
evidence exists ? 
Consider the following statement: 
( TBP): "There is a way to cut a sphere into a finite number of 
pieces which can then be moved rigidly and fitted together without 
deformation to form two spheres each of exactly the same volume 
and size as the original. " 
Suppose we have a formal language, for instance a segment 
of the language of mathematical physics, within which this statement 
can be given precise expression. That is, the language speaks about 
three-dimensional Euclidian space and the notion of volume as a 
measure invariant under rigid motions in that space. We then make 
the follo'Ying three statements: 
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( 1) The physicist believes that the statement TBP is false 
because he as signs a zero probability to the set of models for which 
it is true. This probability corresponds to the a priori probability 
P and indicates the physicist's certainty that he will never make an 
observation which implies the truth of the meta-statement TBP • 
Boundary B 
TBP false 
TBP true 
(2) On the other hand, the mathematician says that, in the 
given formal language, the physicist can not prescribe a set of 
sentences that defines the boundary B • The physicist's theory 
will include an object language counterpart of the statement TBP , 
but the mathematician's result, namely the Tarski-Banach Paradox 
[ 17, p. 51 ], [40, p. 244], shows that the physicist's theory must 
not be commensurate with what he really means. It must either (a) 
include models where the statement TBP (at the meta-level, of 
course) is true, or (b) exclude models where the statement is false, 
which the physicist has no a priori reason to exclude, and thus go 
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beyond what the physicist who believes in the first form of reduction-
ism can accept. That is to say, the theory either does not express 
what the physicist believes, or it contains a metaphysical asswnption 
not based on experimental evidence. In the diagram below the line 
labeled X corresponds to a sentence where the first of these is the 
case, and the line Y to a sentence where the second is the case. 
\ y 
" / 
TBP£a1se /V 
// \ 
/ TBP true'\ 
x 
( 3) The situation would be quite different than it actually is 
if the physicist could conceive of an experiment whose partitions had 
boundaries coinciding with the boundary B • The fact is that the 
mathematician's proof of TBP depends upon a non-constructive 
argument. Clearly, it is impossible to show that the statement is 
not true, and to date no one has been able to cut a sphere in such a 
way as to demonstrate its truth. Thus, the physicist's a priori 
assumption can have no adverse effect on the course of his science, 
as guided by experimental evidence. Indeed, it is precisely the type 
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of metaphysical assumption that simplifies conceptual structure in 
a benign way. Graphically, the situation for realistically possible 
observations appears to be more restrictive than for sentences of 
the formal language. Thus, every observation partition will in-
clude models for which TBP is true and models for which TBP 
is false. 
Observation 0 
TBP false 
TBP true 
In the discussion on the meaning of scientific theories, we 
had left open the question of whether an empirical theory required 
tacit knowledge that could not be acquired by means of a finite m.un-
ber of observations. The above argument concerning the Tarski-
Banach Paradox indicates that volume is exactly such a notion. 
We have been talking about the condition where a set of 
sentences together with interpretations of the words constitutes a 
scientific theory, and what we would mean by such a theory. Now, 
returning to the example in the introduction concerning the relation-
ships between abstract theory and empirical observations, we ask 
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similar questions about what we mean by superstitions or myths. 
Again let us say that a mythology or body of superstitions partially 
consists of some set of sentences of a formal language. Certainly 
if such a set of sentences is strictly inconsistent, that is if the 
existential closure of its formulas has no model, then the associated 
state is empty. This corresponds to the case where no possible in-
terpretation can make the sentences true and is clearly too strong a 
condition since for most superstitious beliefs, there is some con-
ceivable configuration of the world in which these beliefs are true, 
although ludicrous. What is implied by stating that some set of 
sentences constitutes a superstition is that the sentences do not 
hold for the true state of the universe. But let us examine this 
more carefully. Suppose that we consider two sets of sentences 
which we will call e . and e . . . Envision a man 
science superstition 
who has verified through observation, at least to a reasonable 
degree, the theory expressed by e . . That is, he has a 
science 
tacit understanding of the meanings of the referent words; let 
this be given by the interpretation cp • In terms of this, he has 
made a sufficient number of observations to convince himself of 
the truth of e . . We emphasize that he has carried out this 
science 
verification of e . in terms of his implicit knowledge, as 
science 
embodied by cp • Now, holding this tacit understanding cp, the 
sentences e t•t• are indeed irrational. 
supers 1 ion 
On the other hand, it is certainly conceivable that another 
man at another time and in another place, having tacit understanding 
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cp' of the words of the language, quite different from that of our 
scientist, would indeed have verified by observation the truth of 
e. . . • Further, the tacitness of both cp and cp' imply 
superstition 
that it may be impossible for either man to communicate to the 
other what he has in mind, nor would this be surprising if their 
experiences were vastly dissimilar. Thus, superstitions can not 
be claimed to be false, but merely untrue in terms of our current, 
tacit understanding of their referent words. 
The second form of reductionism discussed in chapter I 
concerns the relationships among scientific theories; the im-
portant question in this regard is when can one scientific theory be 
reduced to another more fundamental theory? The analyses pre-
sented earlier in this chapter bear directly on this problem, and 
we will utilize several of the key concepts from them in commenting 
upon it. 
In the introduction we mentioned that the theory of thermo-
dynamics was demonstrated to be restatable in the framework of 
classical mechanics. We wish to examine the meaning of such a 
reduction, but we propose to consider a case of greater current 
interest. Suppose therefore that we are concerned with the reduction 
of biology to modern physics. We can assume that both of t.he5e 
theories are characterized by sets of sentences, say eb. 1 and io ogy 
e. . together with appropriate interpretations of their referent physics' 
words. Since these theories are both empirical in nature, we know 
that certain tacit knowledge, embodied in the interpretations, is 
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necessary to fully understand what these theories are to mean. Let 
us go so far as to assume that some single scientist fully grasps 
the meanings of all the words germain to both domains; formally, 
this understanding is embodied in a single interpretation cp. This 
unrealistic assumption is made for the sake of convenience only and 
is not pertinent to our argument. 
Now, consider actually reducing the theory of biology to 
physics. What does this mean? Well, if we are able to restate 
eh. 1 in terms of e h . and "P then we will have succeeded. 10 ogy p ys1cs 
Thus, intuitively, we introduce a number of definitions of the ref-
erent words of eb. 1 characterized in terms of the words and 10 ogy 
relationships of e h . • Having done this, we can in principle p ys1cs 
then translate any sentence of eb. 1 into some set of sentences 10 ogy 
of e h . • But what will we have accomplished? We have re-p ys1cs 
duced the tacit knowledge necessary to the theory of biology, but 
we are still left with the tacit knowledge inherent in physics. There-
fore, even if this process can be carried out, we have not in any 
way reduced biology to absolutes as would be required by the first 
notion of reductionism. Can we reasonably expect to carry out this 
reduction of biology to physics? What we must do is to define all 
biological concepts in terms of the tacitly understood notions of 
physics, as specified by cp , and the laws and hypotheses expressed 
by e h . . As an example, consider the biological term "cell". p ys1cs 
We have previously indicated the possibility that the tacit nature of 
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such concepts may require the use of an infinite, non-recursive 
set of sentences to characterize them. In this case, however, we 
do not need to characterize the meaning of "cell" absolutely, but 
only relative to the tacit knowledge of the theory of physics. 
Because of the failure of the first form of reductionism, 
there are biological concepts, say for instance "cell", knowledge 
o~ which can not be gained from a finite number of observations 
without some prior tacit understanding. The second form of re-
ductionism, for example the view that biology can be reduced to 
physics, implies that cells can be completely characterized by 
a finite number of observations, with the tacit knowledge limited 
to the notions of physics. 
What makes this problem particularly difficult is that if 
one already has tacit knowledge of what a cell is, then statements 
of physics concerning the nature of cells can be highly informing, 
and one will respond to an appropriate physical description by say-
ing "Yes, cells are like that". On the other hand, suppose one had 
never looked through a microscope or seen a drawing of a cell, nor 
h;:td any knowledge of cytoplasm. cell membrane, metabolism. or 
the like. It seems extremely doubtful that a notion of cell could 
then be conveyed by a finite description. Certainly one could de-
scribe a somewhat more general notion, and it is tempting to say 
that a finite description could be constructed that would be adequate 
for all practical purposes. Long before a student had digested the 
- 125 -
physical description, however, it would seem that the temptation 
would be even stronger to send him to the microscope with the 
comment, "Once you've seen a few you'll understand". 
Our point here is not to refute the second form of re-
ductionism, but rather to make clear the nature of the argument 
against it. We have established the necessity of tacitly known 
concepts in science which can not be fully confined with fewer than 
an infinite number of observations. The existence of such entities 
clearly makes it plausible that certain concepts relevant to one 
science may only be reducible to the tacitly known concepts of a 
second science through an infinite, non-recursive description or 
an infinite number of observations. This would be especially so 
when the laboratory experiences are as disparate as those of 
biology vis-A-vis physics, or psychology vis-~-vis biology. 
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VI. INFORMATION AS RELATED TO LANGUAGE CHANGE 
In the preceding chapters, we have primarily been concerned 
with the characterization of a single individual 1 s view of some domain 
as reflected in the particular formal language he employs to describe 
it. Now, however, we wish to consider some of the problems in-
herent in the communication process. Since communication neces-
sarily involves two or more individuals, we must deal simultaneously 
with more than one formal language. As indicated previously, even 
though two individuals may both consider a given string of words to 
he grammatical, they need not as sign equivalent meanings to it. 
That is, the sentence may result in a totally different partitioning of 
the model space for the two individuals. Furthermore, even if they 
do agree completely on the meaning of the sentence, the fact that 
they may have different a priori probabilities could induce corres-
pondingly different *-probabilities and thereby result in one of them 
believing more strongly than the other in the truth of the sentence. 
In order to clarify the possible relationships among differ-
ent formal languages, we will introduce several auxiliary concepts 
based on our previous definitions. One of the things we would like 
to know is when one formal language can be considered to be more 
expressive than another. This· is related to the sets of states of the 
two languages. 
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Definition: Let e1 , 6 2 be the sets of states of the formal languages 
.£1 , .t2 , and let e I' e 2 be bases for .t1 , .t2 • Then .£2 is at 
least as expressive as .t1(.t2 ~ £ 1) if F.1 ~ 6 2 and if for every 
basis element ll € tB1 , there is a basis element ll' € 18 2 ~ such that 
n' s;;; n. 
To properly motivate this definition, we must consider what 
the intuitive meaning of expressiveness is. As we will use the term. 
it is intimately linked to the commonly accepted notion of precision of 
expression. That is, if two individuals are both asked to describe 
some event which they both have witnessed, one of them might reply 
by enunciating the statements ,,1, 'Yz• and ,,3 • The other might 
then agree that those statements were indeed true of what they ob-
served, but might also add that -y4 , 'Ys• and ,,6 were also true, 
thereby presumably giving us a more refined picture of the actual 
circumstances. The implication here is that even though the two in-
dividuals may have made the same observations, one of them ex-
presses details of these observations which the other considers 
irrelevant. We have previously emphasized that the individual's 
formal language directly reflects not only that which he is capable 
of expressing, but necessarily also that which he considers to be 
relevant. 
Our notion of expressiveness, however, can be considered 
applicable in a somewhat broader context than the previous example 
indicates. For instance, suppose the two individuals described above 
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consider themselves to be in fundamental disagreement about the 
event which occurred. That is, one of them either can make no 
sense of what the other says, or he feels that it is untrue of what 
happened. This certainly need not mean that one of them is wrong; 
it may simply be that certain strings of words have radically differ-
ent interpretations relative to their respective formal languages. 
Thus, if we were sufficiently omniscient to be able to comprehend 
exactly what each observer means, then we might very well be able 
to conclude not only that there was no basic disagreement, but also 
that one individual had rendered a more precise description than 
the other. 
In view of this discussion, let us now examine the specifics 
of our definition. The first requirement is that every state of the 
less expressive language must also be a state of the more expres-
sive. Notice that this does not imply that the same strings of words 
are used to define these states in both of the languages, but in general 
the more expressive language will be capable of characterizing a 
greater number of states. The second condition pertains to the bases 
of the two languages. The requirement here is that for each basis 
element of the less expressive language there is a basis element of 
the more expressive language contained in it. However, the more 
expressive language may have additional basis elements which are 
not contained in any of the basis elements of the less expressive lan-
guage. Recall that the basis is a set of minimal states which are 
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pairwise distinguishable and that these states represent mutually 
exclusive configurations of the universe relative to the language. 
The basis elements thus form what might be called a kernel set of 
I 
states for the language, and our requirement is that if one language 
is to be considered more expressive than another it must be capable 
of more precise expression with respect to this kernel .. 
The relation of expressiveness can easily be seen to be both 
reflexive and transitive, and thus it induces a pre-ordering on the 
set of all formal languages and their bases, and a partial ordering 
of their state-partitions on the set of models. We emphasize that 
expressiveness is related primarily to the semantics of formal lan-
guages since it is a condition on the state diagram, and it is only 
indirectly tied to the syntax and the specific vocabulary of the lan-
guages. Nevertheless, our expressiveness relation is quite strong 
since it demands that the state diagram for one language be a proper 
partitioning of the state diagram for the other. There may be some-
what weaker conditions under which one language could be said to be 
more expressive than another, but even our relatively restrictive 
definition has some surprising implications. 
One intuitively feels that the more expressive a language is 
the more suitable it is as a descriptive tool. The question we wish 
to consider next is whether more expressive languages are more 
informative to the individual who employs them. In other words, if 
an individual makes some observation O which he can describe in 
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a formal language .£1 , and the resulting information gained is 11 , 
then if he had some more expressive language .£2 :?'. £ 1 , would the 
informativeness of the same observation 0 necessarily be equal 
to or greater than 11 ? To aid in the investigation of this, we shall 
consider an example. Figures 9, 10, and 11 show the state diagrams 
for three hypothetical languages ~l , r.2 , a.nd .£3 • Ea.ch of these 
languages has been obtained from the preceding one by the addition of 
some new sentence. Thus, .t2 is the same as r.1 with addition of 
the single sentence ,..3 , and similarly t 3 results from adding the 
sentence ,..4 to t 2 • This is one trivial way of obtaining a more 
expressive language, as our intuition would suggest. In each case, 
the basis for the language is shown by the elements with the heavy 
borders. We remark that t 1 has a unique basis, whereas .£2 and 
t 3 do not; £2 has the same state diagram as the language shown in 
Figure 5. The fact that t 2 and £3 do not possess unique bases is 
unimportant for the present, but we will comment on the implications 
of this later in the chapter. As before, we assume that the a priori 
probability P is proportional to area on the diagrams. Thus, for 
example. in Figure 9 the a priori probability of the minimal state 
TT, P(TT), is equal to 1/9, and in Figure 11, P(T¢F¢) = 1/36. 
Referring to our definition of expressiveness, we see immediately 
that J: ~ J: ~ .£ 3 2 1 • 
On each diagram, we have illustrated three observations o 1 , 
o2 and o3 • These represent typical observations which might be 
made, but they are not presumed to be related to each other in any 
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T 
T TT 
__ ........................................... .___ ---- --- ---
V F 
l 
Ft/> 
Figure 9. State diagram for language J: 1 and three possible 
observations, o1 , o2 , and o3 • The regions 
with heavy borders are basis elements. 
- 132 -
T F T 
T TTT F 
T<PF ~ 
}'<$>}' / 
Yl F FTT 
/ 
/ 
/ 
F<P<P 
------/I </JFF / 
I // 
</JTF I / </JF</J 
Figure 10. State diagram for language s.2 showing the same 
observations as in Figure 9. The regions with 
heavy borders are basis elements. 
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/ 
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/ c/>F<bF 
F F 
T Y4 
Figure 11. State diagram for language : 3 showing the same 
observations as in Figures 9 and 10. The regions 
with heavy borders are basis elements. 
- 134 -
specific way. Thus, we will assume that there are three observers 
whose views of some domain are characterized by .t1 , .t2 , and .t3
, 
and we shall determine the >:<-probability of the observations o1 , 
o2 , and o3 for each language. The result of this will indicate the 
relative informativeness of these observations with respect to the 
observers. Recall that the >:<-probability of an observation 0 is 
given by: 
We first calculate the a priori probability P (in these examples P 
and P are identical) of the union of all basis elements, which we 
denote as Xj for language S.. • This is done simply by inspection 
J 
of the three diagrams. 
( 1) For S,1 ' 
1 P(X ) = 4/9 • 
( 2) For S,2 ' P( x
2) = 9 I 18 • 
(3) For S,3 • P( X3) = 19 I 36 • 
Now, let Y~ be the union of all basis elements of language S... which 
1 J 
are indistinguishable from observation o. . We may then compute 
1 
>',c 
p. (mo ) by the following formula: 
J i 
P(Y~) 
1 
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As one instance of this computation consider o3 and 1z in Figure 10. 
In this case Y~ is the following: 
Y~ = {TTT U FTT U T¢F} , 
and therefore 
z 
* P(Y3) 5/18 
P (Tn ·) ~ ~ """'° :: s /9 . 
z 03 P(X2) 7/ .LO 
The following table summarizes the value of p* for each observa-
tion and each language: 
.tl 
o1 l/Z > 4/9 < 9/19 
o2 l/Z > 4/9 > 8/19 
03 l / 2 < 5 / 9 < 11/l9 
Each of the observations thus exhibits a different behavior as 
the language changes from r.1 to tz to r.3 • Since the informative-
ness of an observation relative to a language is defined in terms of 
the logaritlun of the *-probability, the informativeness becomes 
relatively higher as the *-probability decreases toward zero. Thus, 
the inequalities shown in the table among the probabilities are reversed 
when we consider the associated informativeness. Observation o2 be-
haves in the manner we might at first expect. That is, as the language 
changes to become more expressive the expectation, relative to the 
language, of observing o 2 decreases; and hence o2 is most inform-
ative for language .£3 • On the other hand, both o 1 and o3 demon-
strate a rather surprising phenomenon, namely that it is possible for 
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the information obtained from an observation to decrease as one 
moves to a more expressive language. o1 is particularly inter-
esting because the information is greatest relative to lan·guage 
.s:2 • What this suggests is that there may be formal languages 
which are optimum, in the sense of informativeness, for the des-
cription of certain classes of observations, and :further that these 
are not necessarily the most expressive languages which could be 
employed. More specifically, for observation q , the language 
t,2 is such that if we employ either the more expressive language 
.s:3 or the less expressive language £-1 , then the information we 
obtain on observing o1 decreases. 
This example again demonstrates the significant role of lan-
guage in the characterization of an individual's view of his universe. 
If his language provides a rather loose or vague description of the 
phenomena he observes, there will be many detailed observations he 
can make which will yield little information; and conversely, if his 
language is overly expressive, the additional structural complexity 
of the language may diminish the informativeness of certain other 
observations. The reasons for this are directly related to the notion 
of meaninglessness; the fact that a formal language always makes 
various implicit or unstatable assumptions about the structural 
nature of its domain of discourse-as embodied in the semantic 
categories, for instance-causes sentences of the language to be-
come meaningless on some models. This, in turn, means that 
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indistinguishability is not an equivalence relation, as we have shown, 
and consequently very expressive languages may not be particularly 
informative for certain classes of observations. 
Languages £2 and £3 , shown in Figures 10 and 11, do not 
possess unique bases, as we mentioned previously. In addition to 
the bases outlined in the diagram, S.z has another basis, namely 
e = {TTT, TFT, FTT, FFT, FFF, ¢TF} , 
and similarly : 3 also has the basis 
~={TTTF, TFTF,FTTF,FFTF,FFFF,¢TTT,¢TFT,cbrFF). 
These can easily be shown to be the only other bases for .t2 and 
.t3 • The question is, what are the implications of a non-unique 
basis for the probability and hence the informativeness of some 
observation? In the particular example we have chosen, if we 
associate the two bases above with t 2 and s.3 , in lieu of those 
shown in Figures 10 and 11, then it can be verified that the prob-
abilities assigned to the three observations o 1 , o2 , and o3 are 
unchanged for both languages. Consequently, the informational 
relationships among the languages also remain the same for these 
observations. In general, however, there will be other observ-
ations for which the choice of basis does affect the probability. 
This is particularly significant since it means that the syntax and 
semantics of a formal language may not be sufficient to uniquely 
determine the *-probability of all observations. More specifically, 
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knowledge of the truth values of all sentences on all models may not 
characterize a unique basis. As a result, there may be situations 
where a particular formal language has more than one basis, and 
thus different *-probabilities could conceivably be associated with a 
single observation; and yet it would normally be assumed that a 
rational individual acts as though a given observation has only a 
single probability. This implies that an appropriate basis for the 
language must be chosen to satisfy criteria which we have not ex-
pliciily treated. The resolution of this question seems to lie in 
considerations involving the dynamics of language change. That 
is, as an individual's language evolves or develops to reflect his 
growing knowledge and changing perspective on his world, the 
mechanisms which determine exacily how his language will change 
presumably take into account aspects of his past experience, there-
by causing one basis of his new language to become preferable to 
others. As we have previously indicated, an investigation into the 
nature of the processes involved in language change is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
It is interesting to note that if a formal language does not 
possess a unique basis, there is nevertheless a more expressive 
formal language which does have a unique basiso The more expres-
sive language simply includes sentences which distinguish the pre-
viously indistinguishable minimal states of the less expressive 
language. Of course, the converse is also true, as the previous 
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example shows; that is, for a language with a unique basis there is 
a more expressive language with a non-unique basis. The languages 
.t2 and .t1 in Figures 9 and 10 are related in this way. We point 
this out merely to illustrate that for more realistic languages than 
those used in our examples, it is not necessarily the case that they 
would especially tend to have either a unique basis or multiple bases. 
The example of Figures 9, 10, and 11 has shown that the in-
formation content of an observation does not generally strictly in-
crease or decrease with the expressiveness of the language describ-
ing it. However, supposing that the languages we had used each pos-
sessed a unique basis, can we then demonstrate that the information 
would either increase or decrease monotonically with expressiveness? 
Again the answer is no, but rather than exhibiting further examples 
we will give a detailed analysis of the conditions under which infor-
mation increases or decreases. 
E G .. :. 
F 
C D 
A 
...... ·~'"'' ·1 
__ _J 
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Suppose that we are given two formal languages .£1 and .£2 , 
where .£2 ~ .t1 , and suppose they have bases ~I and 182 • The 
preceding diagram shows both bases superimposed on the set of 
models rn. 
The representation of the two bases is strictly schematic; 
the various lettered regions indicate sets of models contained in the 
basis and grouped together according to their indistinguishability or 
distinguishability relative to some set of models h ~ rn which is 
assumed to be associated with an observation. Basis j81 consists 
of the sets C, D, E, F, G, and basis ~ of the sets A, B, E, F, 
G. These sets are characterized by the following relationships 
with respect to the set of models h. 
A: h/ 2 A B: h// 2B 
C: h/ l C D: h// 1n 
E: h/ l z E 
' 
F: h// l, 2F 
G: h// 1G and h/ 2 G 
The subscripts indicate for which of the two languages the relation 
holds. Thus, for example, h// 1 D indicates that the set of models 
D is indistinguishable from h in language .s:1 • Also, the models 
in D are not included in basis ~ • Assuming each of these sets 
>'c 
is measurable, we can express the *-probabilities, P ~ ( h) and 
>:::: 
P 2( h ), as follows: 
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= P(F) + P(G) + P(D) 
P(F) + P(G) + P(D) + P(C) + P(E) 
~~ h P(F) + P(B) 
P2( ) = P(F) + P{G) + P(B) + P(A) + P(E) 
P~(h) is the >:c-probability of h for language £ 1 , and P~(h) is the 
>:c-probability of h for language .s:2 • The nwnerator of each frac-
tion is the a priori probability of those models in the basis which are 
indistinguishable from h , and the denominator is the a priori prob-
ability of the union of all basis elements. 
Since we wish to examine the difference in information content 
of the observation corresponding to h as the language changes from 
£1 to the more expressive language £2 , we can use the ratio 
* >'c P 1 ( h)/P ~(h) to accomplish this. That is, if for some specific h 
the ratio equals one, then the information is unchanged; and if the 
ratio is greater than one, £2 is more informative than £1 • Con-
versely, if the ratio is less than one, .£2 is less informative than 
£ 1 , with respect to h. Notice that the sets of models E and F 
are defined so that they each have the same relationship to h in 
both languages; the others, however, namely A, B, C, D, and G, 
differ in their properties of distinguishability or indistinguishability 
as the language changes. An increase in the measure of any one of 
these sets, for example in P(A), affects the ratio as follows: 
Increase in ..• 
P(A) 
P(B) 
P(C) 
P(D) 
P(G) 
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Change in ratio P~:( h) /P;( h) 
increase 
decrease 
decrease 
increase 
increase 
In each of the cases, all other quantities are asswned to re-
main fixed. The table shows that an increase in either P(A), P( D), 
or P(G) causes an increase in the ratio and hence an increase in 
the informativeness of the observation corresponding to h • Simi-
larly, increasing P(B) or P{C) results in a decrease in informa-
tiveness. Note that h is assumed to be the same set of models in 
both languages. Also, changing from some h to a different h' , 
will generally redistribute the sets of models among the various 
categories. However, the sets corresponding to AU B, CUD, and 
EU FU G are fixed by the two languages t 1 and s.,2 and are in-
dependent of h • 
Before we interpret the intuitive meanings of the various 
po:;eiible change:; in A, 13, C, D, and G, we would like to establish 
that these are not interdependent. That is, in order to make this 
analysis meaningful we must show that each of the sets of models 
corresponding to A, B, C, D, and G may either be empty or non-
empty in any combination. The following theorem shows that this is 
in general possible. 
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Theorem: There exist formal languages £ 1 and s..2 > £ 1 , such that 
there are sets of models h (corresponding to possible observations) 
for which the sets A, B, C, D, and G may be empty or non-empty 
in any combination, i.e. A, B, C, D, and G are independent of one 
another. 
Proof: The proof is by specific examples, and because of its length 
it is contained in the appendix. 
The preceding theorem implies that for two formal languages-
one more expressive than the other-there will generally be some 
observations which are less informative relative to the stronger lan-
guage; and further that the change in informativeness from one lan-
guage to another is effected by variations in the measures of the sets 
A, B, C, D, and G , each of which could be large or small independ-
ent of the others. For example, consider the sets A and B • How 
can they be interpreted? Their union, AU B contains all basis ele-
ments of the more expressive language .£2 which are disjoint from 
every basis element of £.1 • These additional minimal states there-
fore represent new theories which are alternatives to those describ-
able in £.1 • Here, we are identifying minimal states with complete 
theories within the language. That is, as we have previously dis-
cussed, the sentences defining a minimal state characterize some 
configuration of the universe as precisely as the language allows. 
The observation in question, namely the one associated with h , 
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either partially confirms or denies the theories constituting A , and 
hence the information gained tends to increase in this more expres-
sive language. On the other hand, the minimal states which B 
comprises are indistinguishable from h and therefore, as theories, 
are generally neither refuted nor verified by the observation. Con-
sequently, the information tends to decrease since the observation 
does not aid in resolving among the additional theories represented 
by B. 
Now consider the sets C and D ; C U D is composed of 
models which were members of basis 581 but are not members of 
basis 582 • These excluded models are therefore indistinguishable 
from some basis elements of .t2 • The members of the set C were 
previously distinguishable from the observation and thus represented 
distinct alternatives within the less expressive language. Their 
elimination from the basis 582 means that they are no longer con-
sidered viable alternatives, and since h is now distinguishable 
from fewer models in the basis, it becomes a less informing ob-
servation relative to .t2 • The converse is true of the set D ; the 
models in D were not distinguishable from h in ! 1 and conse-
quently, eliminating them from ss2 has the effect of increasing the 
informativeness of the observation. 
Finally, the set G consists of models which are members of 
both bases, 58i and 58.z • In language .t1 these models were indistin-
guishable from the set h and were thus considered to be equivalent to 
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the associated observation. In language .t2 , however, these same 
models are distinguishable from h , and therefore .t2 has sentences 
which make this distinction. This means that .t2 can more precisely 
delimit the set of models h than t 1 can. Consequently, Sz is more 
informative with respect to this observation than .t1 since the 
>:<-probability of h will be less for £2 by an amount proportional 
to the measure of G, P(G) • 
The result that increasing expressiveness may reduce infor-
mation is at first contrary to intuition. This appears to stem from 
the fact that one considers that the conceptual apparatus of any 
reasonable language should be adequate to make all relevant distinc-
tions among configurations of the universe. If this were the case, 
the only change in basis that could take place between one language 
and a second more expressive language would be of type G , and 
thus information would increase monotonically with expressiveness. 
This is not so. The classic result establishing this fact is Tarski' s 
theorem on truth [39, p. 247], which states that the notion of truth 
for a formal language of sufficient expressive power can only be 
stated within another formal language that is necessarily more ex-
pressive. Once this essential inadequacy of the descriptive power of 
a language is seen, the potential for other changes in basis becomes 
apparent and hence the possibility for the reduction of information on 
pas sage to a more ex:pres sive language. 
Having established some general properties of the change in 
information with language, we will now re- examine the problem of 
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ramification of meaning which was presented by an example in the 
introduction. Recall that the example we used concerned two in-
dividuals, each of whom had a clearly different concept of the mean-
ing of the word "transistor". In view of the apparatus we have de-
veloped we can now see that these two individuals can be considered 
to utilize two distinct, although related, forrna.l languages. Ea.ch 
language thus embodies one individual's conceptualization of the 
relevant properties of transistors. We expect that each man has 
certain observational experience pertinent to transistors, and fur-
ther that these two sets of observations are related, exactly in the 
sense defined in chapter III. As we have implied, we certainly can 
assume that their formal languages are in some way related since 
they are both concerned with describing and understanding many of 
the same basic phenomena. How might their languages be related? 
One plausible relationship would be that one language is more ex-
pressive than the other. That is, the solid- state physicist's language 
l may be strictly greater in expressive power than the language p 
l of the circuit designer. In this relatively ideal case, the state 
c 
. diagram for the language f.; would properly partition the state p 
diagram for l The following two figures illustrate corresponding 
c 
portions of the total state diagrams for the languages. 
The set of models h corresponds to the observation which 
has been made by both individuals; we assume that this observation 
involves some transistor which is behaving in an interesting or novel 
S, 
p 
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!., 
c 
fashion. The dashed lines partition the model space in the usual way 
and are presumed to be associated with sentences about transistors. 
In this special case, we will further assume that the four sentences 
shown for !.. are identical, syntactically and semantically, with 
c 
the corresponding four sentences of S, , i.e. those other than a. p 
Consequently, if the physicist enunciates one of these statements, 
the circuit designer will agree that it is true of the observation, and 
vice-versa. But what of the statement a? a is a sentence of the 
physicist's more expressive language S., , but if it is also a sentence p 
of l it does not have the same meaning and is therefore not useful 
c 
in characterizing h. Thus, the physicist assigns a meaning to a 
in such a way that it is relevant to the observation. On the other 
hand, the circuit designer considers a either incomprehensible or 
irrelevant, i.e. meaningless on h or unnecessary to characterize 
h. Nevertheless, communication still takes place on a limited basis 
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since there is some fundamental agreement about what has been ob-
served. Even regarding a , there may be no disagreement; it is 
simply a !!.Q!! sequitur to the circuit designer. Notice that h is 
most precisely delimited by the language £ • This would indicate p 
that the observation that was made is of greater importance to the 
physicist and presumably is more informative.. As we have empha-
sized in this chapter, however, we can not conclude in general that 
h is more informing relative to t without knowing something p 
about the other alternative theories and hypotheses within the lan-
guage. 
The preceding example is idealistic in that we have assumed 
complete agreement in meaning for at least some of the sentences 
pertinent to the observation. Thus, with the exception of the state-
ment a, S.. and £ are inter-translatable; at least this is true at p c 
the meta-level. It will generally not be true, however, that either 
individual "knows" that the meaning he attaches to some sentence is 
exactly the same as the meaning assigned to that sentence by the 
other individual. Indeed, it is possible that there will be an apparent 
agreement in concepts, but that this may break down on the basis of 
additional evidence. Suppose, for example, that the preceding dia-
grams were actually as shown in the following figures. Here we 
assume that the four sentences (excluding a) in £' are composed p 
of the same words as the four sentences shown for £' , although 
c 
each individual clearly associates a somewhat different meaning 
S} 
p 
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c 
with them. h and h 1 are sets of models characterized by two 
distinct observations involving transistors. If both individuals 
make the observation corresponding to n, then the situation is 
almost exactly as before-namely there is agreement on all of the 
statements except possibly a. On the other hand, if the actual 
observation corresponded instead to h' , then one of the statements 
which the physicist says is true of the observation, although under-
stood by the circuit designer, is not strictly true of n' in his lan-
guage t~ . The important point here is that as long as the obser-
vations shared by the two individuals have the characteristics of h, 
their languages will seemingly agree, in spite of the fact that the sen-
tences do not have identical meanings. Only when aorne observation 
is associated with a set of models similar to h' will the actual con-
ceptual differences be made explicit. In our example, h' might 
possibly be the set of models resulting from an observation of a 
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peculiar type of semiconductor device which functions like a transistor 
in the physicist's view, but which the circuit designer does not con-
sider to be a legitimate transistor because, for example, it only be-
haves properly at very high temperatures. 
Notice that observations which make explicit the underlying 
differences in two languages can occur even when one language would 
be said to more precisely specify some concept, such as transistor, 
than the other. Consequently, the problem of communication between 
two individuals having more or less ramified views of some domain 
has two primary aspects. First, there may be statements like a 
which are relevant to one observer and not to the other. These are 
no fundamental barrier to communication since there may be apparent 
agreement on sufficiently many other statements so that ideas may 
still be adequately exchanged. Nevertheless, it is statements like a 
which tend to make certain observations more informative to one in-
dividual than the other, and hence to motivate or prompt communic-
ation. Therefore, the most relevant or precise statements which can 
be made are exactly those for which the communication breaks down, 
forcing one individual, or possibly both, to describe the observations 
in more general terms. 
Secondly, this necessary abstraction from the most precise 
statements that could be made, even though it enables communication, 
may mask certain inconsistencies among the languages. These in-
consistencies may be revealed by observations which have not as yet 
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been made, but it is possible that such observations will never be 
made by the two individuals. In the latter case, there will always 
appear to be an agreement among the individuals, in spite of the 
fact that they each have a different conceptual view of the same 
domain. 
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VII. THE PROBLEM OF INDUCTION 
Certainly one of the central problems in understanding sci-
ence is to comprehend the inductive process-namely, how one 
arrives at general conclusions on the basis of specific observational 
evidence. The solution to this problem is one of the ultimate aims 
of this thesis, and although we have not been able to solve it directly, 
we have provided mechanisms that allow us to propose two new hypoth-
eses. These hypotheses suggest directions for further research 
which rnay prove fruitful in resolving this difficult problem of the 
modern philosophy of science. As these hypotheses are firmly 
founded on our developed formalism, we consider them one of the 
central results of this thesis, and this chapter will be devoted pri-
marily to a presentation of them and an investigation of their impli-
cations. 
In chapter I we introduced a number of problems pertinent to 
an understanding of the scientific method, all but two of which have 
been discussed in terms of our formal apparatus. The remaining 
two concern the reinterpretation of the words of a language and the 
apparent disparity between the explicit and implicit scope of a sci-
entific paper. We first show that both of these are instances of the 
general problem of induction. Thus consider the circumstances 
which cause a particular word to assume some new interpretation; 
this clearly comes about as a consequence of some relevant obser-
vational evidence. Suppose for example that we have observed five 
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hundred white ducks and no black ducks. It is highly likely that our 
definition of "duck" includes the property of their being white. If 
we now see a black duck we have two obvious choices; we must 
either modify or reinterpret the meaning of the word "duck", or 
we can conclude that this new creature we have seen is not a "duck" 
at all. However, if we continue to observe black ducks, this latter 
course will become less and less natural until finally the lack of 
sensible differentiation, on some basis other than color, will cause 
the term "duck" to be redefined. Thus the accumulation of obser-
vational evidence refuting our belief that "ducks" are white will 
eventually induce a different meaning for the word "duck". The 
exact moment when this occurs can be characterized only if we fully 
understand the inductive process. 
Now consider a scientific paper describing some experiment 
and the results obtained from it. Typically, the paper will detail 
the experimental apparatus, the experimenter's techniques, and the 
observed outcome of the experiment. Usually, if it is feasible, the 
experiment will have been repeated a number of times in order to 
reassure both the scientist and the reader that the specific outcome 
of the experiment was not a fluke or chance occurrence. In spite of 
this repetition, however, the actual circwnstances under which the 
experiment was performed represent only an isolated instance out 
of many which might have been chosen. Indeed, the paper will gen-
erally make clear many of the specific restrictions of the experiment, 
and very often the explicitly stated conclusions will be confined to the 
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most direct consequences of the observed results. However, as 
time goes by, and further consistent evidence is obtained, some 
subsequent paper may make the claim that "all entities of the type 
studied will behave in a manner consistent with the experimental 
results presented". Thus the inductive leap is made explicit. 
Long before this occurs though, the dissemination of previous 
results may lead others to inductively infer this same conclusion. 
Such implicit generalizations are yet another example of the in-
ductive process. 
In light of our previous discussions, it can easily be seen 
that induction may be validly characterized as a change in language. 
However, before commenting further on this, let us briefly examine 
the possibilities inherent in language change. First, we know that 
for many concepts, such as the integers or volume, there is no for-
mal language which can constructively characterize them. Thus, 
any mechanism describing language change will necessarily fail to 
explain how such concepts can be sensibly interpreted, without 
some reference to extra-linguistic aspects of their meanings. 
Another salient point is that there is no most expressive language. 
This results directly from the Tarski theorem on the definability of 
truth for a language (39, p. 273], since if there were such a lan-
guage, say ! , we would be unable to specify the meaning of "true 
in t" for lack of a more expressive language in which to do this. 
This contradicts the fact that a meta-language for £ can be for-
malized and truth for £ defined within it. Consequently, 
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continually moving from one language to another more expressive 
language is a non-terminating process. Furthermore, as we have 
seen, we may actually be losing information, thereby defeating 
our purpose. These basic limitations on language change suggest 
that the forces leading to such change are the product of other con-
siderations. 
One possibility is that the formal language that characterizes 
a person's view at a given instant is determined by his a priori 
probability and the swn total of his observational evidence. In situ ... 
ations where the need for tacit knowledge can be limited only by an 
infinite number of observations, any finite number of observations 
will leave room for language change compatible with these obser-
vations. Thus, one would expect an adjustment of tacit knowledge 
to take place as a function of the a priori probability, and within 
the latitude remaining over and above available observational evi-
dence. What remains is to identify the forcing function or criterion 
involved. The literature considers, for example, such forcing 
functions as simplicity, though .. these remain ill-defined. 
It is interesting to note that traditional treatments of induction 
have been based primarily on a fixed language which is presumed to 
be adequate to express all relevant concepts. By using a fixed lan-
guage and defining induction within its rigid framework, several 
aspects we feel are basic to the inductive process have been over-
looked. For instance, this precludes changes in the meanings of 
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words as a factor in explicating induction. Also, if the language is 
static we can not make use of shifts in the level of abstraction or 
expressiveness relative to some concept. Furthermore, even 
though tacit knowledge-as embodied by the interpretation of refer-
ent words-has been generally accepted, its dynamic role in induc-
tion does not s:eern to have been recognized. As we mentioned, 
tacit understanding by its very nature allows for a certain flexibility 
in an observer's language. Thus linguistic changes can be made 
which do not conflict with the observer's previous observational 
experience, except in the limiting case of an infinite number of 
observations. Because we are convinced that the essence of the 
inductive process involves considerations of the temporal aspects 
of language, we seek an explanation which can fully utilize changes 
in the meanings of words, shifts in the generality or abstraction 
of language, and the freedom of expression resulting from the im-
plicit nature of tacit knowledge. 
A related problem of the philosophy of science is that of uni-
versals [30, chap. 6] • For example, consider the concept of being 
red. Clearly our knowledge of what is red is not directly related to 
knowledge of what specific objects are considered to be red; this we 
conclude because our concept of red obviously i_s not altered when, 
for one reason or another, an object we are viewing changes its color. 
Suppose we can account for tacit knowing in terms of inductive proc-
esses that determine how we exploit the leeway in the meaning of 
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words above and beyond our observational evidence. If this can be 
done, universals can be readily explained as the "end product" of 
such processes. 
Bearing in mind all of these factors, and as an outgrowth of 
our developed formalism, we now propose two hypotheses as pos-
sible avenues for explication of induction. 
( 1) An individual seeks that language which maxi-
mizes the informativeness of his previous ob-
servational experience. 
By this we mean that an individual attempts to adjust his language in 
such a way that it provides him with the most informative possible 
view of his observations. The information referred to here is to be 
interpreted exactly as defined in chapter IV. In chapter VI we de-
monstrated that there may be formal languages which maximize the 
information in any particular set of observations, and further that 
these languages are not necessarily highly expressive languages. 
This result lends credence to hypothesis ( 1) since it suggests the 
existence of formal languages which are optimum, in the sense of 
informativeness, for a given set of observations. In order to be 
able to state unequivocably that this is the case. however JI we 
would need to develop other concepts which characterized the 
specific mechanisms bringing about language change. Thus, al-
though we know that for some formal language and for particular 
observations there are other formal languages-both more expres-
sive and less expressive-which are less informative, we do not 
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know, nor do we suspect, that linguistic change is based purely on 
expressiveness. Consequently, further investigation is necessary 
to establish not only that maximally informative languages exist 
but also that, given their existence, they can be reached by the 
natural processes of language change. 
Many of the above points are also relevant to our second 
hypothesis, which we now state: 
( 2) An individual seeks that language which 
maximizes his expected gain in information 
based on anticipated observational alter-
natives. 
Although the first hypothesis was clear in terms of previous dis-
cussions, this second hypothesis needs further interpretation. 
Therefore, in order to gain insight into the implications of hypoth-
esis (2), we will make use of the following rather trivial but sug-
gestive example. 
Suppose a scientist conceives of two experiments that he 
might perform to increase his understanding of some domain. The 
following diagram indicates how these hypothetical experiments, 
e1 and e2 I might partition the Set Of models h S:: rn • h iS pre-
sumed to be the entire set of models associated with the scientist's 
previous observational experience. Also shown are two hypotheses, 
'Yi and -y2 , of the scientist's formal language. 
Each of the two experiments has three possible outcomes, 
two of which are specifically labeled on the diagram. Thus, for 
- Fi<J -
h 'YI 
1/5 2/5 
'Yz 
1/5 1/ 5 
Case I 
I I I 1 l 
example, the outcomes of e 1 are Ei, E 2 , and E 3 ; E 1 and E 2 
are delimited by ellipses on the diagram, whereas E! consists of 
all those models not in either of the other two. A similar situation 
holds for the second experiment e 2 • The two sentences 'Yi and 
'Yz partition h into four regions, each presumably a state of the 
scientist's language. The numbers in these regions indicate the 
,:~-probabilities that the scientist associates with these states. We 
have previously discussed the expected informational gain for an 
experiment and developed a mathematical definition of it in terms 
of the >:'-probability. Suppose we now assume that the scientist 
plans to perform first experiment el and then experiment e2 . 
The two experiments taken together have nine possible observational 
outcomes. For example, one of these is given by E~ n E; and 
I 2 
another by E 2 n E 2 • In this simple case we can easily compute 
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his anticipated informational gain by using the following formula: 
( i) t 3 >!< 1 2 ):c l r(e 1 and ez> = - L p ( E. n E.) log p ( E. n i:) . 
i= I J= I 1 J 1 J 
Arbitrarily choosing the natural logarithm we obtain the numerical 
answer, r(e 1 and e2) = 2. 681. The absolute value of this answer has 
no particular significance, but we shall be interested in comparing 
it to several other cases. 
Now consider the situation where the scientist has performed 
experhnent e 1 and has found that the outcome lies to the right of the 
line labeled -y1 , i.e. the observed outcome was E! • He can now do 
experiment e2 I knowing the result of e I , and determine which of 
the remaining admissible states of his language best characterizes 
the actual circumstances. What is the expected gain in information 
in this case? By taking the conditional *-probabilities we may 
compute the expected increase as before. The following formula, 
(ii) I(e 21 IE~) ~ -~ p*(E: IE~) log p* (E: IE~) 
yields the numerical result I(e. 2 j E
1
1) = O. 637. As we would surmise 
the expected gain is less than for the previous case, since the scientist 
already has knowledge of the outcome of experiment e 1 . 
Now we shall reproduce the preceding analysis with one change. 
Inherent in the previous diagram is the assumption that the scientist 
has certain tacit interpretations of the words of his language. Pre-
sumably his interpretations were inductively drawn from a finite 
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number of observations. However, as discussed at length in 
chapter V, the meanings he has attached to these words may not 
be able to be fully delineated by any finite set of observations. 
Consequently, there is a degree of freedom remaining in the 
tacit meaning he associates with these words (as we have seen for 
the word "volume" ) . In the preceding diagram the scientist 
has exercised that freedom in a certain way. We draw the dia-
gram again as it could appear had he exercised his freedom with 
regard to tacit meaning in a somewhat different way. 
h 'Y1 
'Yz 
Case II 
The salient difference between this diagram and the pre-
ceding concerns the hypothesis 'Y • This statement partitions the 
l 
models in a different manner because of our presumed change in 
tacit meaning, and accordingly the ):'-probabilities of the four 
states are now altered. Using formula (i) we can again compute 
the expected informational gain prior to performing either exper-
iment. The following result is obtained: I(e I and e 2) = 2. 205. In 
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a similar fashion we use formula (ii) to calculate the increase in 
information for experiment e2 ' given that the outcome of experi-
ment e 1 is known. Our new result is: I(e 2 1 E~) = O. 693. 
Notice first that the expected gain in information prior to 
either experiment is higher in Case I than in Case II. Thus, at 
this point in tirne, by exercising his freedom in as signing mean-
ing to the referent words, the scientist would presume that Case I 
represented the more meaningful. position. However, the observed 
outcome of his first experiment eliminates previously admissible 
models in such a way as to render the initial (Case I) meanings of 
the tacit terms less useful informationally, as can be seen from the 
fact that the expected information for the second experiment is con-
siderably higher in Case II than in Case L Under these circum-
stances the scientist could be expected to conclude that a change in 
his tacitly accepted concepts is called for in light of experiment e1 , 
which results in his modifying the meanings of the referent words. 
Let us see how this might work in practice. 
Suppose an ornithologist is on a field trip, and observes some 
bird he has never seen before and says "That is a sparrow". Why 
does he not say instead that the bird he sees is an owl? It is tempting 
to say that it looks more like a sparrow to him and so he categorizes 
it as a sparrow, but that begs the question, it is not a satisfying ex-
planation of the scientist's choice. For one thing, he is differentiating 
this creature he perceives not only from owls but also from a myriad 
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of other possible entities. In addition, he presumably knows much 
more about the properties of sparrows than he has actually observed 
of this particular bird. Thus again we are faced with a situation in-
volving inductive inference. However, our preceding example and 
the second hypothesis we proposed provide one possible explanation 
of the scientist's behavior. That is, he says that he sees a sparrow 
because he anticipates that this is an informing view relative to any 
subsequent experiments or tests he might carry out. More precisely, 
although he realizes that further examination might demonstrate that 
the creature is a stuffed bird or that it might hoot like an owl, the 
assumption at this point that it is an owl violates his expectations of 
the bird's behavior based upon prior experience (and a priori prob-
ability). The expected gain in informativeness will be maximized if 
he regards it as a sparrow. Thus, this situation is analogous to the 
hypothetical example of the two experiments, which was presented to 
aid in interpreting hypothesis ( 2). As we pointed out there, the ex-
pected gain in information for a given experiment may be different 
for distinct formal languages. In this particular case we would con-
clude that for the scientist to say that he sees a sparrow rather than 
an owl is more informative to him, based on his experience and the 
observational alternatives he can envision. Note that some other 
individual might well be best informed by calling the creature in 
question a bird, or a wounded sparrow, or perhaps simply an ani-
mal, depending on his orientation and anticipated activities. 
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Hypothesis (2) states that the choice among these is determined by 
a combination of the a priori probability, the sets of models to 
which he is confined by prior observations, the formal language, 
and the experiments or tests which the observer considers to be 
relevant. 
In the discussion of the second hypothesis we have primarily 
considered changes in language resulting from a change in the mean-
ing of referent words. We do not mean t.o suggest that all legitimate 
changes are of this nature. Examples of this type were used for 
convenience only, and in reality we would expect changes in semantic 
categories, semantic transformations or other aspects of the formal 
language. Also, we emphasize that hypothesis (2) does not fully ex-
plicate language change, just as hypothesis ( 1) did not. Again, we 
have not accounted for the actual mechanisms of language change, 
and thus we do not know that maximally informing languages, in the 
sense of hypothesis (2), can always be arrived at in a natural manner. 
We now wish to re-examine the two remaining examples in 
the introduction in light of the two hypotheses we have proposed. As 
the first of these, consider the re-definition of the term "isotope". 
Prior to the discovery of deuterium, isotopes of the same element 
were held to be chemically inseparable, but deuterium was chemically 
separable from light hydrogen. Clearly, once deuterium was dis-
covered, it was either to be called an isotope or it was not. What 
factors aided in resolving this question? As we know, the term 
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"isotope" was tacitly re-defined to include thing·s like deuterium, and 
of course this change caused corresponding modifications of the 
associated formal languages. If we take the viewpoint of hypothesis 
( 1), we would say that the change in meaning of the word "isotope" 
resulted from adopting a more informative position with respect to 
the previously observed properties of deuterilllTI. That is, the 
scientists in question found that classification of deuterhun as an 
isotope was more informing than considering it to be in a category 
of its own. Thus deuterium was observed to be sufficiently much 
like other isotopes so that a change in the concept of isotopy could 
be accommodated without conflicting with knowledge of their prop-
erties. 
The outlook on this problem afforded by hypothesis (2) is 
slightly different. The second hypothesis suggests that to regard 
deuterium as an isotope, thereby modifying the notion of isotopy, 
was more informative with respect to its potentially testable-but 
as yet unverified -properties. We might say that the essential 
difference between the two hypotheses is that the first relies most 
heavily on previous experience while the second combines this with 
anticipatory factors. This "looking ahead" of the second hypothesis 
is based on the particular tests and experiments which seem plausible 
and relevant to the theories to be investigated. We should mention 
that Polanyi' s [26, p. 111 J analysis of this example states that 
"isotope" was re-defined to reflect its "truer meaning". It is 
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difficult to know what basis one could have for such an absolute 
judgement. If one were to construe the word "true" in the sense 
of better fit with observation as in "the carpenter trues up the wall 
of the house", then Polanyi' s comment is directly related to the 
view presented here. We would emphasize that our hypotheses do 
not depend upon an absolute truth. Rather, they rely on the individ-
ual's conception of what appears most informative to him in the 
light of previous experience and his metaphysical assumptions. 
This admits the possibility that his view is actually false of reality, 
i.e. some of his assumptions are false of the true model M0 • 
With regard to the second example, which concerns the ex-
plicit and implicit scope of a scientific paper, we can suggest one 
possible resolution of the apparent disparity. The salient point 
here is that the scientist finds it·most informative to employ one 
formal language in writing a paper for a journal and another in 
guiding his personal research. Thus, suppose that he is a biologist 
studying the functions of vision in the wolf spider. For purposes of 
his own research and as a means of determining appropriate experi-
ments to perform, he is likely to employ a formal language which 
facilitates generalizations of the specific experimental outcomes he 
perceives. That is, he may ignore certain known idiosyncrasies 
of his experimental apparatus and the particular spiders he is using 
as subjects on the assumption that these distinctions will eventually 
be shown to be irrelevant. In the sense of our second hypothesis 
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he will find it most informing- based on experiments he expects to 
perform-to make use of a formal language whose states coincide 
well with the scientist's long term expectations regarding alternative, 
and as yet unproven, theories about the general phenomena he is 
studying. This may, for example, result in his ignoring the pecu-
liarities of the wolf spider since he anticipates that his conclusions 
will eventually prove valid for a much broader class of animals. 
On the other hand, when the scientist is writing a paper about 
his results, different considerations may motivate his choice of for-
mal language. For one thing, in contrast with his personal specu-
lations, he is now very definitely concerned with making statements 
which are "true", or hypotheses which are almost certainly correct. 
But what he actually knows to be true falls far short of what he ex-
pects will later be proven true. Consequently, he will take great 
care to ensure that he fully describes the specific and detailed con-
ditions of his experiment and that he does not over-generalize the 
results he has obtained. Thus, in this situation he is confronted 
with the problem of communicating his results to some community 
of scientists with similar backgrounds, without making the paper 
either unnecessarily detailed and trivial or overly vague and 
speculative. Since he generally presumes, although perhaps in-
correctly, that his readers have a common understanding of many 
of the concepts involved in his paper, the scientist can attempt to 
employ some formal language which will be most informative to 
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them. Thus, even though he does not explicitly state many of the 
generalizations of his results which he personally suspects to be 
true, he can tailor the language he uses to allow others to induc-
tively infer what are to them the most informative consequences 
of his results. In this sense, hypothesis ( 1) would seem to pro-
vide the most reasonable explication of his behavior. That is, he 
seeks a language which maximizes the information relative to 
his specific observational experience. He then can asswne-
based on the presumed similarities of his readers' languages-
that they will augment his statements with hypotheses and 
generalizations analogous to those he feels will ultimately be 
proven correct. In this respect, hypothesis (2) seems to be 
most applicable. 
Neither of the examples presented in this chapter as 
characteristic of the inductive process could be considered to be 
solved by our hypotheses. Nevertheless, it does appear that they 
provide a new and useful insight into these difficult problems. As 
we have mentioned, the primary missing ingredient is our current 
inability to characterize the actual mechanisms of language change. 
We have, however, suggested informativeness as the force under-
lying such changes, and either of our two hypotheses, or perhaps 
some combination of them, provide possible guidelines for an in-
vestigation of the dynamics of formal languages. 
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Let us swnmarize what we have accomplished in this thesis. 
A scientist tries to find structure in the world around him. He does 
this by formulating and testing scientific theories. At one time it 
was thought that this could be done by the slow accretion of scientific 
knowledge, by a systematic procedure often referred to as the sci-
entific method. We now know that this is not the way science de-
velops, and that there are many difficult and unsolved problems in 
explaining science and the scientific method. In this thesis we have 
developed a formal method for attacking these problems. The con-
cept of a formal language has been introduced to explicate the notion 
of structure. A clear distinction has been made between language, 
or conceptualization! on the one hand and observation on the other 
hand. We have made clear the necessity of tacit knowledge which 
could not be fully delimited by any finite amount of observational 
evidence. The existence of this tacit knowledge provides the leeway 
within which a scientist can shift his language to fit his ever in-
creasing experimental evidence. By introducing the notion of 
probability we have developed a related measure of information 
as a function of formal language, as well as of observation. Fi· 
nally we have suggested that either information or expected in-
formation, or some combination of these, can be used as a forcing 
function to define the concept of an optimal formal language for a 
given body of observational evidence. Thus we suggest that the 
process of science is not one of discovery of structure, so much 
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as it is a fitting of structure to experimental evidence; and more 
importantly, we have provided a formal apparatus for making this 
suggestion precise. 
We have attempted to study these problems inherent in 
the scientific method from the point of view of the meanings of 
sentences, without a correspondingly detailed analysis of the 
meanings of individual words. Such analysis we believe is a 
natural extension of what we have done and will certainly be nec-
essary in conducting further investigations of induction and other 
related problems of the methodology of science. It has also be-
come apparent that the temporal processes of language change, 
as well as the static informational aspects of language, are in-
volved in the development of science-particularly, as we have 
seen, in the problem of induction. 
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APPENDIX 
In this appendix, we prove the theorem stated in chapter VI 
which asserts the independence of the various quantities affecting 
the informativeness of an observation as the language changes from 
less expressive to more expressive. For convenience, we repeat 
the following diagram. 
E 
. · .. G 
F 
C D 
.· 
·. 
A 
B I 
__ J 
~I is the basis for language .s:1 and ~2 the basis for .£2 • Also, 
.£2 is assumed to be at least as expressive as .£1 , i.e. .L2 :c? .L1 • 
The sets A, B, C , D, E, F, and G may be characterized as 
follows: 
A: h/ 2 A B: h// 2 B 
C: h/ IC D: h// l D 
E: h/ 1, 2 E F: h// 1, 2 F 
G: h// l G and h/ 2 G 
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The set of models h is assumed to correspond to some 
arbitrary observation. Since E and F have the same properties 
with respect to h in both languages, they are not of interest. The 
sets A, B, C , D, and G are the ones we wish to prove independ-
ent of one another. 
Theorem: There exist formal languages : 1 and J:2 , ~ ~ li such 
that there are sets of models h (corresponding to possible obser-
vations) for which the sets A, B, C, D, and G may be empty or 
non-empty in any combination, i.e. A, B, C, D, and G are in-
dependent of one another. 
Proof: We shall exhibit a language J:1 and four languages corres-
ponding to .£2 (this is the minimwn possible number), and for each 
of the 25 = 32 cases where some combination of A, B, C, D, and 
G could be non-empty, we will choose an h to show that this com-
bination is actually realizable. Each of the languages we shall illus -
trate has a unique bas is, as indicated by the elements with the heavy 
borders. The first figure shows the state diagram for language .£1 • 
The next four figures show the possible cases for language £ 2 , and 
in each case J:2 ~ J:1 • Following each of these figures is a table 
designating some set of models h and, for each n , the status of 
the sets A, B, C, D, and G • In these tables, a "l 11 indicates 
the corresponding set is non-empty and a "0" that it is empty. 
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If a table entry lists more than one element, where these are 
separated by commas, then ll is the set of models obtained by 
taking the union of all elements listed. The characteristics of 
the set h with respect to the basis for £1 and for the particular 
case of ct2 determine whether A, B, C , D, and G are empty 
or non- empty. 
T F 
T TT TF T<i> 
-
F FT FF Feb 
-
"' 
<J>T I J/>F I </><t> I I 
I I 
I I 
The above figure shows the state diagram for language J.\ . 
For this and each of the subsequent figures, the truth values are 
subscripted to indicate the sentence to which they correspond. 
Thus, for example, F 2 designates the region where sentence 
'Yz is false. 
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Case L A = B = C = D = O. Suppose .£2 is -
h 
FTF 
TTF 
cPTF 
A 
0 
0 
B 
0 
0 
TcP T 
c/>FF 
c D G 
0 0 0 
0 0 1 
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Case II. C = D = O. Suppose ~2 b-
T F <Pz T3 F3 
Tl TTTF TFTF 
F4 
T4 
FTTT Fc(JFF 
Fl 
--
¢1 c/>FFT 
"¢cbFF 
' 
' 
F4 </J</>FT 
' T4 
h A B c D G 
¢TTT, ¢TFT, 0 I 0 0 0 
T¢FF, T¢TF 
¢TFT, T¢FF 0 1 0 0 1 
FTTT 1 0 0 0 0 
FFFT 1 0 0 0 1 
T¢FF, T¢TF l 1 0 0 0 
T¢FF 1 1 0 0 I 
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Case III. A = B = O. Suppose .£2 is -
Tc/>T 
Fc/>T 
"'1 c/>Tc/> 
h A B c D G 
FT¢, FF¢ 0 0 0 1 0 
FT¢, FF¢, FFF 0 0 0 1 1 
TFT 0 0 1 0 0 
TTT 0 0 1 0 I 
FT¢ 0 0 I 1 0 
FF¢, FFF 0 0 I I I 
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Case IV. Suppose £2 is -
T3 
Tz Fz <Pz. T4 T6 <1>5 
F4 
'T</>TT</>T / 
Tl " 
/ 
TFTTTT 
Fc/>TFTT 
"</>c/>TFTT 
" " 
" c/>c/>FFTT "' 
h A B c D G 
T¢TFTT, ¢T¢FFT, 0 I 0 I 0 
¢T¢TFT, TTFTTF, 
TTTTTF 
T¢TT¢T, T¢TF¢T, 0 1 0 1 1 
F¢TFTT 
T¢TT¢T, T¢TF¢T, 0 I I 0 0 
TTFTTFJ TTTFTT. 
TTTTTF 
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Case IV (continued) 
h A B c D G 
T¢TT¢T, T¢TF¢T 0 I I 0 1 
¢T¢FFT, ¢T¢TFT, 0 I I I 0 
¢T¢FTT, ¢T¢TTT, 
FT¢TTT, FTFTTT, 
TTFTTT, TTTTTT, 
TTFTTF, TTTTTF 
¢T¢FFT, ¢T¢TFT, 0 1 1 1 1 
¢T¢TTT, ¢T¢FTT, 
FT¢TTT, FTFTTT, 
TTFTTT, TTTTTT 
FT¢TTT, FF¢FTT, 1 0 0 1 0 
FF¢TTT 
FTFTTT, FFTTTT, 1 0 0 1 1 
FFTFTT 
TFTTTT 1 0 I 0 0 
TTTTTT 1 0 1 0 I 
FF¢FTT, FFTTTT 1 0 1 1 0 
FF¢FTT 1 0 1 1 1 
¢T¢FTT, FF¢TTT, 1 1 0 I 0 
FFTTTT, TTFTTF, 
TTTTTF 
¢T¢FTT, FF¢TTT I 1 0 1 1 
T¢TTTT, TTFTTT 1 1 I 0 0 
TTTTTF, TTFTTF 
T¢TTTT 1 I I 0 I 
¢T¢TTT,. ¢T¢FTT, 1 1 1 1 0 
TTTTTF, TTFTTF 
¢F¢FTT I 1 I I I 
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